

9 JUNE 1989



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Asia**

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***Southeast Asia***

# East Asia

## Southeast Asia

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## CONTENTS

9 JUNE 1989

### INTER-ASIAN

Optimism Prevails At Mekong Conference *[BANGKOK POST 31 May]* ..... 1

### BURMA

Foreign Investment Notification *[Rangoon Radio]* ..... 3

### CAMBODIA

#### COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

VONADK Summary of NADK May Battle Successes *[VONADK]* ..... 6

### STATE OF CAMBODIA

Soviet-Aided Radio Station Handed Over to Battambang *[Phnom Penh Radio]* ..... 7

Siem Reap Official on Khmer Rouge Troops' Surrender *[QUAN DOI NHAN DAN Mar]* ..... 7

Bou Thang Reviews Growth, Political Building of the KPRAF  
*[TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN Jan]* ..... 8

### INDONESIA

Kadin Patron Says Trade With China Unlikely To Diminish *[ANTARA 4 Jun]* ..... 13

Suharto Opens ASEAN Information Ministers Conference *[ANTARA 24 May]* ..... 13

Minister Explains Establishment of Plywood Marketing Boards *[KOMPAS 15 Apr]* ..... 14

Minister, Party Officials Comment on Forthcoming PPP Congress *[MERDEKA 4 May]* ..... 14

Armed Forces Commander on News Presentation, Media *[ANTARA 1 Jun]* ..... 15

Economy Advancing But Still Slowest in ASEAN *[KOMPAS 7 May]* ..... 15

Domestic Plastics Industry Dependent on Imports *[SUARA KARYA 2 May]* ..... 17

### LAOS

USSR-Aided Bridge Under Construction in Pakse *[PASASON 27 Apr]* ..... 18

Houa Phan Firm Signs Agreement With SRV Factory *[PASASON 24 Apr]* ..... 18

Oudomsai Plans 1.7 Billion Kip in Exports; Illegalities Noted *[PASASON 12 Apr]* ..... 18

Finance Ministry Sources on Debt Limit Boost *[SIAM RAT 3 Apr]* ..... 18

### MALAYSIA

Paper on Berjasa Pullout From Barisan Nasional *[BERITA HARIAN 30 May]* ..... 20

### THAILAND

Central Bank Chief Warns of 'Overheating' Economy *[BANGKOK POST 26 May]* ..... 21

Drugs, Cigarette Trade Issues Draw Comment ..... 21

MP on Drug Patent Protection *[SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN 2-8 Apr]* ..... 21

Editorial Scores U.S. *[THAI RAT 1 Apr]* ..... 22

Editorial Criticizes U.S. on Cigarettes *[THAI RAT 17 Mar]* ..... 23

VIETNAM

POLITICAL

Ethics, Economy Included in Premier Do Muoi's Interview <i>[DAI DOAN KET Feb-Mar]</i> .....	24
Discussion on Eliminating Formalism, Making FF Work Effective <i>[DAI DOAN KET Mar]</i> .....	25
Reorganization of State Mechanism Discussed <i>[NHAN DAN 15 Mar]</i> .....	26
Decline of Youth Union Discussed <i>[HANOI MOI 17 Mar]</i> .....	28

MILITARY

General Calls for Renovation of Political Education <i>[TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN Apr]</i> .....	28
Official Stresses Importance of Peacetime Readiness <i>[TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN Mar]</i> .....	31
Activities of Truong Son Corps <i>[QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 10 Mar]</i> .....	33
Demobilized Soldiers Face Problems, Lack Jobs <i>[QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 7 Mar]</i> .....	34

ECONOMIC

Chinese Goods Flood Markets <i>[SAIGON GIAI PHONG 25 Apr]</i> .....	35
Swedish, Danish Assistance to Cement Plant <i>[VNA]</i> .....	36
Air Link Opens Between Jakarta-Ho Chi Minh City <i>[VNA]</i> .....	37
Economic Briefs <i>[VNA]</i> .....	37
Low Vegetable Prices in Hanoi, Problems for Producers <i>[QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 9 Mar]</i> .....	37
Discussion on Weaknesses, Tasks of Peasants Association <i>[QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 3 Mar]</i> .....	38

SOCIAL

NHAN DAN Article Reviews Red Cross Activities <i>[VNA]</i> .....	40
Red Cross Donates Money for Natural Calamity Victims <i>[VNA]</i> .....	40
Tropical Storm Damage 'Heavy' in Central Province <i>[VNA]</i> .....	41

BIOGRAPHIC

Information on Vietnamese Personalities .....	41
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**Optimism Prevails At Mekong Conference**  
*BK3105005589 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English*  
*31 May 89 p 4*

[Text] As a result of recent political developments and an atmosphere of rapprochement in the Indochina conflict, optimism has emerged among members and donors of the Interim Mekong Committee.

After over a decade in limbo, there is now a feeling that the Mekong River can be turned into—as described by Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan in April—the common lifeblood for friends and neighbours.

Executive Agent of Mekong Secretariat C. Jan Kamp notes that the favourable atmosphere during the 29th session of the Interim Mekong committee held in Khon Kaen during May 22-25, makes prospects promising for various mainstream projects of the Mekong River.

Member and donor nations welcomed the recent developments in the region which will have a positive impact on the committee's work in the near future.

As a result of the improved atmosphere, financial support from foreign countries have increased by some 10 percent from last year. More important is that Cambodia may rejoin the committee. A representative from the Phnom Penh regime will be invited in January to observe the working session usually restricted to members of the committee.

In fact, representatives of the Hun Sen government already oversee development projects of the Mekong Committee through the regular meetings of national committees of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

"With the participation of Cambodia in the committee, the regional projects will certainly be speeded up for the benefit of the region," Mr Kamp said. With Phnom Penh's participation in sight, more projects will be proposed for the committee's consideration. Mr Kamp said it would not be so difficult to find financial support if the proposed projects prove to be appropriate.

The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) substantially reduced its financial support to the Mekong Committee after 1985. UNDP support is expected to lessen next year too, since more countries are becoming cooperating countries on various projects, Mr Kamp said, adding that Australia, Sweden, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy and Switzerland have consistently provided aid to the committee. Other countries have also expressed interest but said that support would depend on an improvement in the regional situation.

Mr Kamp said the World Bank, which became involved with the committee in the early years, will resume certain aid in the near future. Theo van Banning, deputy chief of

Southeast Asian Countries Unit and head of the Netherlands delegation, said that the plan to withdraw Vietnamese troops from Cambodia and set up an internationally recognised government is a positive change and development.

"Most of countries appear to realise that economics is better than politics as has been used in previous years," Mr Banning pointed out. Besides, another clear development involves Thailand itself. "The Huai Pa-thoa Dam project in Chaiyaphum Province, which is actually part of the Mekong Committee, has been financed by the Thai Government herself. The prospect is very positive since donor countries can switch more money to help countries as Laos and Vietnam and possibly Cambodia in the future," Mr Banning said.

Another positive prospect for the committee is that more funds are being set up for project implementation rather than project study in the area of farm production, which means that people in the countries concerned will have more food to consume. Although the committee was set up to support and implement regional projects, political differences of the past 10 years have made implementation of main-stream projects impossible, forcing the committee to focus on national projects.

For instance, the Lower Pha Mong multi-purpose dam is expected to be one of the mainstream projects to be implemented. Sweden this year offered some \$200,000 for further study of the impact of the project.

The Lower Pha Mong 210 dam project, located about 30 kilometres upstream of Vientiane, will affect some 32,000 people on Thai side and 11,000 in Laos. The project will produce 2,250 megawatts of power and 500,000 rai of farmland will benefit from irrigation. However, some 80 per cent of power would be consumed in Thailand.

Mr Banning of the Netherlands pointed out the main problem of the dam construction would involve human resettlement rather than ecology. In this session, Thai representatives confirmed the economic soundness of the project, saying that it is their hope that the committee, blessed with a recent improvement in the climate of cooperation in the subregion, will leave no stone unturned in its exploration to implement the project.

However, in a country report addressed to the session, different representatives from Thailand, Laos and Vietnam delegations, did not make any direct mention of the project. In the resolutions of the session, there is also a hint of differences of opinion on the project which Thailand fully supports.

It states that "the member countries emphasised the complex nature of the Pha Mong project and the implementation requires a favourable international environment and proper determination of the dam's place in the

cascade." The participation of Cambodia in the committee might be fulfilled soon, but the mainstream project of Pha Mong project will continue to be an issue of discussion on the international level, particularly among member countries as well as on the local level.

Chief of the Vietnamese delegation Mr Dinh Gia Khanh, vice minister of the Ministry of Water Resources, pointed out that the meeting this year was quite active in comparison to the one in 1988. "Delegates for member and donor countries have become more open with one another, making a better and more positive atmosphere for cooperation."

He agreed the plan to withdraw Vietnamese troops from Cambodia would make the world community contribute more to the development projects of the Mekong Committee. Vietnam has proposed various projects to solve various problems in the Mekong Delta, including flood control, salinity, soil erosion, navigation as well as reafforestation.

Concerning Thailand's Chi-Mun development plan for Green Isan project, which needs water resources from the Mekong River, Mr Khanh said that the plan should come under the context of the Mekong Committee since the benefit of the Mekong should be shared by all countries concerned.

"Too much water diverted from the Mekong River will create problems for Vietnam (which is) located downstream," he said, adding that with the present friendship and cooperation, solutions to any problem could be reached.

On this issue, Laotian representative Dr Somphavan Inthavong, vice president of the State Commission for External Economic Relations and Commerce, agreed that the issue must be discussed in detail, particularly the effect of the project on Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia.

He agreed, however, with the Thai Government in creating projects that will directly help the poor people in the northeastern provinces. "Our common enemy is poverty," he stressed. Dr Somphavan noted that the meeting in Khon Kaen was the first of the Interim Mekong Committee organised in a province close to the Mekong basin. "I can say, it is the most successful meeting of the committee in 14 years."

Laos has received about more than two million dollars from European donor countries for various projects including navigation, dam and water resources development in this session. "The amount of aid is not as important as the cooperation under new favourable conditions. This would hopefully lead to private investment in our country," Dr Somphavan said.

**Foreign Investment Notification**  
*BK3105110189 Rangoon Domestic Service in Burmese  
1330 GMT 30 May 89*

[“Notification No. 1/89 of the Foreign Investment Committee of the Union of Myanma on types of economic enterprises permitted for foreign investment; dated 30 May 1989—11th day of the waning moon of Kason, Burmese Era 1351”]

[Text] Exercising its rights under Section 5 of Article 3 of the Foreign Investment Law Procedural Rules of the Union of Myanma, the Foreign Investment Committee of the Union of Myanma, with the approval of the cabinet, announces the following list of types of economic enterprises permitted for foreign investment:

**List of economic enterprises:**

**1. Agriculture:**

- Cultivation, production, processing, distribution, and sale of seasonal crops;
- Cultivation, production, processing, distribution, and sale of long-term crops, including tapioca and tobacco leaves; and
- Farm produce including medicinal herbs, coffee, tea, and palm oil.

**2. Meat and Fish:**

- Livestock breeding and related distribution and sale;
- Production, processing, canning, distribution, and sale of animal products;
- Pig farming and processing of pork;
- Production, distribution, and sale of animal feed and supplementary feed and veterinary medicine;
- Breeding, catching, processing, distribution, and sale of both fresh water and sea fish, prawns, and other marine animals in all places with the exception of ponds designated by the government for fish and prawn research;
- Processing, distribution, and sale of fish fingerlings and baby prawns and animal feed, including fish and prawn feed.

**3. Forestry:**

- Production and sale of goods manufactured with teak produced by the state enterprises. The goods include basic construction materials, furniture, and floor tiles. This sector is to be carried out in joint venture with state enterprises.
- Production, distribution, and sale of wooden sculptures and carvings made with teak wood produced and sold by the state enterprises.
- Production, milling, distribution, and sale of forest products, such as hardwood, cane, and bamboo, but excluding teak.
- Manufacturing, distribution, and sale of construction materials, furniture, and other consumer goods using

forest products, such as hardwood, cane, and bamboo, but excluding teak.

**4. Minerals:**

- Exploration, mining, production, distribution, and sale of industrial raw materials and minerals, such as coal, lime, and common quartz. Excavation of sandstone and production, distribution, and sale of sandstone and other quarry enterprise, including distribution and sale of the quarry products.

**5. Industry:**

**A. Food products:**

- Production, distribution, and sale of cereal products such as biscuits, noodles, macaroni, vermicelli, and rice noodles.
- Production, distribution, and sale of confectionary, including candies, cocoa, and chocolates.
- Processing, canning, distribution, and sale of other food products.
- Production, distribution, and sale of oil and solid fat from vegetables and animals.
- Production, distribution, and sale of beverages and cordials. Fermentation of malt and production of beverages made of fermented malt.
- Production, blending, distilling, bottling, distribution, and sale of alcohol and alcoholic beverages.

**B. Textiles:**

- Ginning, spinning, weaving, processing, distribution, and sale of cotton, jute, silk, wool, synthetic fiber, and other fibers.
- Production, distribution, and sale of clothes and garments, including knitted ones.
- Production, distribution, and sale of towels, household textiles, flooring, carpets, and ready-made garments.
- Production, distribution, and sale of all kinds of ropes.

**C. Consumer products:**

- Production, distribution, and sale of all kinds of soap, toothpaste, perfume, and cosmetics. Production, distribution, and sale of other unspecified consumer products, including umbrellas and matches.

**D. Household goods:**

- Production, distribution, and sale of household goods made of textiles, glass, plastics, melamine, metal, ceramic, and earthenware.
- Production, distribution, and sale of non-electric household goods including ceramic ware, pots, pans, plates, spoons, forks, and knives.

- Production, distribution, and sale of electric household goods including refrigerators, air conditioners, stoves, flatirons, and fans.
- Production, distribution, and sale of products such as radios, transistors, televisions, and videos.
- Production, distribution, and sale of electrical appliances, bulbs, lamps, and florescent lights.

**E. Leather, leather goods, and other similar products:**

- Production, distribution, and sale of hide and leather products, including shoes and handbags.
- Production, distribution, and sale of synthetic leather products, including shoes and handbags.
- Production, distribution, and sale of fur and leather.

**F. Transportation goods:**

- Production, distribution, and sale of bicycles, other vehicles, and spare parts.
- Production, distribution, and sale of motorized bicycles, motorcycles, and spare parts.
- Production, distribution, and sale of cars, buses, trucks, trailers, and spare parts.
- Production, distribution, and sale of various kinds of tractors and service vehicles, including ambulances, fire engines, water trucks, and spare parts.
- Production, distribution, and sale of tires and tubes for various kinds of vehicles.

**G. Construction materials:**

- Production, distribution, and sale of bricks, floor tiles, and wall tiles.
- Production, distribution, and sale of construction materials made of asbestos.
- Production, distribution, and sale of cement, cement products, lime, plaster, and related products.
- Production, distribution, and sale of prefabricated concrete pipes and other concrete products, and related machineries.
- Production, distribution, and sale of glass and glass products.

**H. Pulp and paper:**

- Production, distribution, and sale of various kinds of pulp and paper including newsprint and cardboard.
- Production, distribution, and sale of paper and paper products including rice paper, wax paper, and laboratory paper.

**I. Chemicals, chemical products, and medicines:**

- Production, distribution, and sale of basic organic and inorganic chemicals including caustic soda, chlorine, stearic acid.
- Production, distribution, and sale of soft chemicals not stipulated.
- Production, distribution, and sale of plastic products.

- Production, distribution, and sale of paints, varnishes, dyes, solvents, and similar chemical products.
- Production, distribution, and sale of chemicals in gas, vapor, and solid form for industrial use.
- Production, distribution, and sale of various kinds of ice.
- Production, distribution, and sale of various kinds of medicines.
- Production, distribution, and sale of various kinds of pesticides.
- Production, distribution, and sale of rubber products.
- Production, distribution, and sale of recycled chemical and plastic products.

**J. Iron and steel:**

- Production, distribution, and sale of iron and steel products produced with iron and steel bought from state enterprises or from abroad.
- Production, distribution, and sale of basic iron and steel products produced with iron and steel bought from state enterprises or from abroad.
- Production, distribution, and sale of basic non-ferro metals produced with metals bought from state enterprises or from abroad.
- Production, distribution, and sale of prefabricated construction materials for construction work.

**K. and L. Machineries:**

- Production, distribution, and sale of farm machineries and equipment.
- Production, distribution, and sale of machineries and equipment for the timber industry.
- Production, distribution, and sale of machineries and equipment for mining.
- Production, distribution, and sale of machineries and equipment for timber-based industry and other industries.
- Production, distribution, and sale of machineries and equipment for science, medical science, surgery, and optical instruments.
- Production, distribution, and sale of electrical wires, switches, transformers, generators, and batteries.
- Production of machineries and equipment for communications, including telegraphic and telephone equipment and distribution and sale of these products with government permission.
- Production, distribution, and sale of various kinds of water pumps.
- Production, distribution, and sale of unspecified machineries and equipment including pistons, piston rings, injection pumps, and nozzles, and iron smelting equipment.
- Construction of small-scale factories and mills.
- Production, distribution, and sale of machineries and spare parts.

- Production, distribution, and sale of cables, chains, and steel cables.
- Production, distribution, and sale of electronic and electrical equipment including movie and photographic films and video and cassette tapes.
- Production, distribution, and sale of watches and clocks.
- Production, distribution, and sale of fountain pens, ballpoint pens, pencils, and stationery equipment.
- Production, distribution, and sale of mechanical and nonmechanical toys.
- Production, distribution, and sale of unspecified machineries and equipment.

6. Construction:

- Construction work for construction projects at home and abroad; construction of factories and mills; installation and testing of machineries and equipment.

7. Transportation:

- Motor transport and maintenance; river transport; dockyard industry; shipping agencies.

8. Trade:

- Hotel and tourism industry.

9. Types of enterprises under the State Economic Enterprises Law:

- Enterprises under Section 3 of the State Economic Enterprises Law as well as those enterprises, which are listed under Section 3, and permitted by the government under Section 4 of that law.

Remarks: The Foreign Investment Committee of the Union of Myanma shall give separate consideration for proposals concerning economic enterprises that are not listed above.

## COALITION GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA

### VONADK Summary of NADK May Battle Successes

*BK0506030089 (Clandestine) Voice of the National  
Army of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian  
2315 GMT 4 Jun 89*

[“Roundup of results of attacks to destroy the fighting forces and repeatedly scatter and dismantle the village and commune administrative networks of the Vietnamese enemy throughout the country in May 1989”—all figures as heard]

[Text] 1. East Kompong Cham battlefield: 14 Vietnamese soldiers killed and 23 others wounded for a total of 37 casualties; 5 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 15 village administrators freed.

2. Kratie battlefield: 3 killed and 2 wounded for a total of 6 casualties; 30 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 26 village administrators and 4 Cambodian soldiers freed.

3. Northwest Phnom Penh battlefield: 18 killed and 37 wounded for a total of 55 casualties; 39 village and 2 commune administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 32 village and commune administrators freed.

4. Kompong Speu battlefield: 8 killed and 7 wounded for a total of 15 casualties; 6 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 5 village administrators freed.

5. Kompong Chhnang battlefield: 7 killed and 4 wounded for a total of 11 casualties; and 11 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled.

6. Kompong Cham battlefield: 4 killed and 6 wounded for a total of 10 casualties; 16 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 15 village administrators freed.

7. Stung Treng battlefield: 6 killed and 7 wounded for a total of 13 casualties; 11 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 18 village administrators freed.

8. Mondolkiri battlefield: 11 killed and 20 wounded for a total of 31 casualties; 7 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 12 village administrators freed.

9. Ratanakiri battlefield: 17 killed and 13 wounded for a total of 30 casualties; 3 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 12 village administrators freed.

10. Battlefields around Battambang Town: 95 killed and 110 wounded for a total of 205 casualties; 45 village and 4 commune administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 14 village and commune administrators freed.

11. Kompong Som battlefield: 39 killed and 44 wounded for a total of 83 casualties; 26 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 2 village administrators freed.

12. Kompong Thom battlefield: 43 killed and 64 wounded for a total of 107 casualties; 38 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 70 village administrators freed.

13. Siem Reap battlefield: 44 killed and 73 wounded for a total of 117 casualties; 33 village and 5 commune administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 142 village and commune administrators and 7 Cambodian soldiers freed.

14. Moung-Pursat battlefield: 21 killed and 22 wounded for a total of 43 casualties; 48 village, a commune, and a district administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 26 village, commune, and district administrators and 3 Cambodian soldiers freed.

15. Kampot battlefield: 66 killed and 60 wounded for a total of 126 casualties; 47 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 91 village administrators and a Cambodian soldier freed.

16. Southwest Phnom Penh battlefield: 91 killed and 61 wounded for a total of 152 casualties; 29 village and 3 commune administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 26 village and commune administrators freed.

17. North Phnom Penh battlefield: 21 killed and 27 wounded for a total of 48 casualties; 50 village and a commune administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 112 village and commune administrators and 20 Cambodian soldiers freed.

18. Koh Kong battlefield: 5 killed and 8 wounded for a total of 13 casualties; 11 village and a commune administrative networks scattered or dismantled; and 3 village and commune administrators freed.

19. Oddar Meanchey battlefield: 19 killed and 8 wounded for a total of 27 casualties.

20. Preah Vihear battlefield: 45 killed and 49 wounded for a total of 91 casualties.

21. North Sisophon battlefield: 59 killed and 81 wounded for a total of 140 casualties; and 56 village, 5 commune, and 2 district administrative networks scattered or dismantled.

22. South Sisophon battlefield: 68 killed and 87 wounded for a total of 155 casualties; and 2 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled.

23. Pailin battlefield: 634 killed and 331 wounded for a total of 965 casualties.

24. Samlot battlefield: 42 killed and 65 wounded for a total of 107 casualties; and 3 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled.

25. Leach battlefield: 18 killed and 21 wounded for a total of 39 casualties; and 4 village administrative networks scattered or dismantled.

26. Peam Ta battlefield: 14 killed and 10 wounded for a total of 24 casualties.

In sum, we killed 1,413 Vietnamese soldiers; wounded 1,137 others for a total of 2,550 casualties; scattered or dismantled Vietnamese administrative networks in 520 villages, 22 communes, and 3 districts; and freed 661 village, commune, and district administrators and 35 Cambodian soldiers.

## STATE OF CAMBODIA

### Soviet-Aided Radio Station Handed Over to Battambang

*BK0506061089 Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 5 Jun 89*

[Text] A ceremony was held in Battambang Province on the afternoon of 3 June to hand over a 20-kw mobile radio station, aid from the Soviet Union [as heard], to Battambang Province. Attending the ceremony were cadres from offices and units throughout the province as well as many Soviet and Cambodian technicians.

On the occasion, Comrade (Katshikov), deputy chief of the trade mission attached to the Soviet embassy to Cambodia, said that the cooperation between the two countries in this area is further proof of their aspiration to employ the media for peace, stability, development, and cooperation.

Comrade (Katshikov) expressed the hope that this transmission network will become a strong bridge linking the central organization to the grass-roots in order to realize the national reconciliation policy.

Also speaking, Comrade Kim Yin, member of the party Central Committee and director general of the Voice of the Kampuchean People Radio, thanked the Soviet party, government, and people for always giving material and moral support to Cambodia's cause of national defense and reconstruction. This gift of a 20-kw mobile radio station to Battambang Province has greatly encouraged our propaganda work, contributed to the quantitative and qualitative consolidation of our ideological work, and further heightened the efficiency of broadcast propaganda

enabling the masses to more clearly understand the national and international situation.

Comrade Sok Saran, deputy secretary of the party Committee and chairman of the People's Revolutionary Committee of Battambang Province, welcomed the donation by the Soviet Union as evidence of the strengthening and expanding bonds of solidarity, friendship, and cooperation between Cambodia and the Soviet Union. He pledged to take good care of the station and to use it to spread propaganda deeply among the masses so that they can contribute even more vigorously to the national defense and reconstruction tasks, thus contributing to the development and prosperity of the motherland.

The ceremony ended in an atmosphere of joy permeated with a high sense of fraternal solidarity after Comrade Kim Yin and Comrade Sok Saran had signed documents handing over and accepting the 20-kw mobile radio station and cut the ribbon as a symbol of its official inauguration.

### Siem Reap Official on Khmer Rouge Troops' Surrender

*42090243 Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 28 Mar 89 p 2*

[Article by Van Khanh: "More and More Khmer Rouge Surrender"]

[Excerpts] Tuon Tich, deputy chairman of the Siem Reap Provincial Special Propaganda Committee, told me that the numbers of Khmer Rouge officers and soldiers who have either surrendered or rallied to his side have sharply increased. If the 1,164 Pol Pot soldiers, who surrendered between 1979 and 1983 and had with them 878 guns of all kinds, then revealed that they had acted that way because most members of their families had been killed by Pol Pot and that later they had been forced to join the Pol Pot forces, those who have now surrendered admitted that they now realized that the situation has changed.

"Please give me more details." [passage omitted]

Tuon Tich affirmed that time was now very favorable for his special propaganda task. He added:

"In 1987, we succeeded in bringing Bun Leng, deputy commander of Pol Pot's 82nd Battalion, to the people's side. Through Bun Leng's role and personal efficiency, by October 1987 we were able to make this entire battalion disintegrate. This year, we have virtually neutralized the so-called Pol Pot's 912th Division. Kroch Heap, deputy commander of the 57th Regiment, has surrendered along with 3 battalion commanders and 23 soldiers, who had with them 30 guns of all kinds. Lam Saem and Men Chan, deputy commanders of the 51st Regiment, have surrendered and later persuaded 61 of their men to rally to our side and to bring with them 76 guns."

Asked about the effects of our military activities on the 51st and 57th Regiments, Tuon Tich said that such

effects were the main reasons why the three reactionary groups have come to a deadlock. The growth of the Cambodian armed forces had an extremely important significance, he said.

"In addition to the border regiment, we have completed the establishment of 15 inland battalions, which would fight independently to defend the areas assigned to them. This result could not have been obtained without the assistance of Vietnamese volunteer troops in terms of building and training."

Tuon Tich sounded very happy and confident when he recounted the outstanding battles of some battalions which succeeded in blocking the enemy's corridors and thus forcing them to fight one another because of serious shortage of foods and finally to surrender and to bring with them all kinds of guns, from mortars 60, H12, B40, and B40.5 to 12.7-mm and recoilless guns. Rewards were given to those who surrendered these guns at the rates of 600 riel for an AK; 1,000 riel, a B40.5; 1,200 riel, a 60-mm mortar; 1,800 riel, a recoilless gun or a 12.7-mm gun, and so on. "Furthermore," he said, "the changing current situation is being very beneficial for our job, i.e., we have a greater reality to prove to the Pol Pot soldiers that 'the Khmer Rouge are getting extremely isolated,' and that the world is firmly demanding that we 'exclude Pol Pot from any future Cambodian government.' We think that we must act more strongly and invest more in this task."

Tuon Tich continued, with a happy tone:

"Lam Saem gave us a pretty important news. I asked him, 'I have heard that Pol Pot was sick and had to convalesce in China, is it correct?' Lam Saem answered, with a smile: 'He is still healthy. I myself saw him in Po-rat, Thailand, when he came to the political re-education school there with Son Sann and Nuon Chea. He requested that we be allowed to move to the next higher class.' He said, 'The party has adopted the policy of fighting, continuing to fight, and ruling out any political solution—only fighting to win total victory.' Lam Saem again said, 'Just because we do not want any more bloodsheds and deaths we have persuaded one another to act, and here we are, we have rallied to the people's side.'" [passage omitted]

#### **Bou Thang Reviews Growth, Political Building of the KPRAF**

42090249 Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN  
DAN in Vietnamese Jan 89 pp 10-26

[Article by Bou Thang, member of the People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea (PRPK) Central Committee Political Bureau, vice chairman of the PRK Council of Ministers, and director of the KPRAF [Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Armed Forces] Political General Department: "The KPRAF, 10 Years of Growth and Some Great Lessons of Experience in Its Political Building"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] I. A Few Words About the KPRAF's Growth [passage omitted]

The last 10 years were a time of great challenge and at the same time a period that marked the extremely important development and growth of the KPRAF. Because they had to be rebuilt from the very beginning, the KPRAF have been going through the entire process of growing from small to large, from little to plentiful, with technical equipment being further improved everyday, and have grown from 21 battalions in the beginning to all three arms now and an ever increasing fighting power. The main force was organized up to division, brigade, and regimental sizes, with infantry being the principal force, and at the same time had all the necessary combat and support branches such as artillery, tanks-armored vehicles, engineering, antiaircraft, special operations, reconnaissance, signal corps, and so on. The navy and air force were also built for the first time in conformity with Cambodia's actual conditions and for the purpose of satisfying the immediate combat needs and at the same time preparing for a base for future development

Local forces consisting of hundreds of companies and battalions were also built on an appropriate scale in all provinces, municipalities, districts, wards, and cities throughout the country.

Militia forces, or the armed forces of the masses being unseparated from production, were developed on a large scale in all hamlets, villages, subwards, factories, enterprises, state farms, communications units, and so on, and in all areas in the country, with their strength reaching up to hundreds of thousands of men.

Systems were established all over to organize command and to ensure logistical and technical services, from top to bottom, from Defense Ministry organs to military regions, divisions, and provincial, district, and basic-level military units.

A network of military schools was gradually built in the entire army and already achieved initial results affecting the elementary and advanced training of cadres at all levels and in all branches of the armed forces.

A network of PRPK organizations, political organs, and political officers in the armed forces was also established from central to basic levels.

Local military work played a very important role in building national defense and defending the Cambodian fatherland. Recently the PRPK Central Committee Secretariat's "Regulation on the Role and Task of Provincial and Municipal PRPK Committees in Leading Local Military Work and Militia Forces" has been widely and uniformly implemented throughout the country.

The body of armed forces' cadres was being developed quickly and correctly, and basically was able to satisfy the army's need for development. The great majority of these cadres underwent various forms of elementary and

advanced training and climbed to higher positions through actual training in combat and in the revolutionary movement of the masses.

Along with the public security forces, the three arms were developing more effectively their role of serving as the hard core for the people as a whole in fighting and proselyting the enemy for the task of defending the country, at the same time actively participating in building the basic level, speeding up the three mass revolutionary movements, and helping to stabilize everyday life and to boost production. According to incomplete statistics, in the last 10 years, the KPRAF, along with the Vietnamese volunteer army, put out of action tens of thousands of enemy troops, forced tens of thousands of others to surrender, seized tens of thousands of guns of all kinds, and seized and destroyed many enemy weapon and food caches.

Through the tempering effects and challenges of actual combat and the work done in the last 10 years, the main-force troops, local troops, and militiamen all showed a rather strong spirit of bearing hardship, fighting gallantly, and overcoming difficulties for the sake of fulfilling their assigned tasks. All three arms had a background of solid growth and of scoring achievements in combat and regular work. There appeared many good examples set by heroes and outstanding emulators and by cadres and troops in combat, building, and regular work; there appeared many units, installations, and localities being praised in state-issued citations as heroic or exemplary units in one or more aspects, with all of them serving as models for the army as a whole to learn from. Thanks to the efforts of KPRAF units to move forward and the wholehearted assistance and close combat coordination provided by the Vietnamese volunteer troops and military specialists, the KPRAF have since 1982 gradually replaced the Vietnamese volunteer troops in assuming part of the military task, and today are moving toward shouldering by themselves the entire task of defending their fatherland in a new state of the Cambodia-Vietnam strategic and combat alliance.

The success in the task of building the KPRAF in the last 10 years originated from the PRPK's correct and creative political and military lines and army-building guidelines; from the vitality of the new social system, a system by the people and for the people; from the support and great contributions of the Cambodian people as a whole; and from the wholehearted and effective assistance of the party, state, army, and people of Vietnam, the direct assistance of the Vietnamese volunteer troops and military specialists in Cambodia, as well as the assistance of the Soviet Union, Laos, and other fraternal socialist countries. [passage omitted]

## II. Some Major Experiences in the KPRAF's Political Building [passage omitted]

On the basis of the reality in the KPRAF's political building in the last 10 years, let us mention some major experiences as follows:

1. To strive to step up political and ideological education in order to heighten revolutionary positions and views and to build the worker class nature for the KPRAF. [passage omitted]

Cambodia's revolution, after the Pol Pot genocidal regime had been overthrown, was facing extremely difficult and complicated tasks. In that situation, the KPRAF's tasks were even heavier and more difficult and required that all cadres and troops have revolutionary understanding and a very great fighting and sacrificing spirit so as to overcome all difficulties and challenges and to properly fulfill all of their tasks. The enemy in Cambodia regularly and strongly stepped up the psychological war by carrying out meticulous and shrewd tricks aimed at destroying the confidence of those people whose political understanding was poor, with the troops being considered among such people. [passage omitted]

We promoted a strong solidarity among cadres, and between cadres and troops, and emphasized strict observance of discipline through self-understanding. We promoted combat readiness and sacrifice as the means to steadily protect the independence and freedom of the fatherland and all revolutionary achievements, to protect public properties, and to enthusiastically take part in productive labor.

We combined the many elements of education as we taught our troops: the line, positions, and policies of the party and the regulations of the state; patriotism, the political and military tasks of the army, and the revolutionary morality and proud history and combat traditions of the KPRAF; and current events in our country and in the world. For the high- and mid-level army cadres, we organized additional teaching to provide them with the necessary knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theories and of some specialized experiences of the parties and armies of some fraternal countries. [passage omitted]

Ideological work had to readily respond to the turning points of the revolution, when it was successful and when it encountered difficulties, when the domestic and international situation showed major changes, or when a unit received a new task, and so on. In these events, it was absolutely necessary for party committee echelons and party chapters to meet in order to grasp and evaluate the political and ideological situation among the cadres and troops in their own unit, to anticipate any possible ideological changes, and hence to adopt correct leadership resolutions, while trying to prevent any negative concept, cases, and acts from happening and putting them in a passive situation before they could respond to them.

Attention had to be paid to closely combining ideological work with organizing work. Attention was paid to building strong organizations in order to build good men on an individual basis. Conversely speaking, only by building good men could we have good organizations. We had

to know how to make all people feel attached to their organization and unit, and to make all party organizations, youth union chapters, and army organizations attach importance to men and have a concern about making them improve. In addition to resolving the matters of ideology and views, we had to absolutely avoid underestimating the matters of policy, to do our very best to care about the material and spiritual living of our troops, and to help the rear areas and families of cadres and troops.

In order to increase the effectiveness of political education and ideological leadership, we had to mobilize cadres of all echelons and sectors, all party, youth union, and mass organizations, all youth union members, and all troops and national defense workers and civil servants for active participation in the political and ideological work. In the latter, party committee echelons at all levels and party chapters were to play the leading role; political organs and political officers at all levels, the role of organizing implementation, supervising, and controlling; and cadres, party members, and youth union members, the role of setting examples by taking the lead. [passage omitted]

2. To strive to build strong party organizations in the army in order to ensure strong party leadership over the army and to serve as the hard core for army building. [passage omitted]

In the first postliberation years, because of the fact that the basic-level units did not have party chapters to assume leadership, we selected the loyal and firm people to put into hard-core teams. These teams both fulfilled the task of leading units in the place of party chapters and created the sources for party development.

On the other hand, in order to create a body of party members serving as a base for building and developing the party in the army, we selected good cadres who satisfied specific requirements and provided them with advanced training in political matters for a period ranging from a month and a half to 3 months. Almost all of these cadres were admitted into the party at the end of the training session. Consequently, we were able to create the first body of party members hundreds of people strong. These party members, in almost all cases, have so far become midlevel and high-ranking cadres, with some of them being now members of the PRPK Central Committee.

At around the end of 1983 and early 1984, divisions, regiments, and a number of battalions had their own party chapters. In KPRAF units, which had been hardened by challenges and regular work, there were many cadres and soldiers who were fully qualified to join the party and to carry out resolutions on party building and leadership by the PRPK Central Committee Political Bureau and Secretariat. The KPRAF Political General Department advocated further stepping up the building and development of the party in the army in order to

satisfy the need for party leadership there. Thanks to the great efforts of the KPRAF party organization and the wholehearted assistance of Vietnamese specialists in addition to good sources of development, since 1984 we have succeeded in getting thousands of additional party members and organizing hundreds of additional party chapters every year.

The leadership-organizing system of the party has so far been set up among main-force and local troops and military organs at all levels. In the army as a whole, a leadership system has been set up to consist of from the Central Military Party Committee to basic-level party chapters.

New party members, prior to their admission into the party, had to go through a short course of training. Generally speaking, they were selected as the right objects and admitted into the party in accordance with the right procedures recommended by the Central Committee, which would ensure good quality as the army really requires. The great majority of party members proved more exemplary and courageous than the masses, in combat, regular work, as well as everyday activities.

Party organizations actively carried out the system of party activities. The principle of collective leadership in the army was carried out by the party committee echelons.

On that basis, the party chapters in the army succeeded at the very beginning in developing leadership efficiency among party organizations and the pioneering role of party members in regard to army units. Leadership proportion also gradually increased. [passage omitted]

The People's Revolutionary Youth Union (PRYU) in the army also was organized and developed more strongly everyday. Through the movements to build PRYU chapters and to strengthen their members, thousands of outstanding members have been admitted into the party. The activities of PRYU chapters and joint chapters had the obvious effects of attracting youths into revolutionary action movements.

But as we look back at the last 10 years, the building and development of party members in the army still showed many shortcomings and weaknesses. For instance, basic-level party organizations were not yet very strong, nor did they take root yet in basic-level units. The leading capacity of party organizations and the effectiveness of party work remained limited. The principle of collective leadership of the party and the system of criticism and self-criticism were not yet carried out on a regular basis. Party members' worker class nature and pioneering capacity were heightened rather too slowly, nor did they satisfy the needs of the revolution. There still were some decadent and degraded party members, who made the masses lose confidence.

The above-mentioned shortcomings set a certain limit to the party's leadership efficiency, which in turn affected leadership and command in connection with carrying out the combat task and regular work of army units.

In the coming years, the direction to be taken for our efforts will be to strive to build a party organization in the army strong in all political, ideological, and organizational aspects; to continually raise the party's fighting capacity and leadership efficiency to a new height; and to enable the party organization in the army to develop its hard-core role in leading the army toward actively shouldering the task of defending the fatherland in the new period.

3. To strive to build a body of cadres strong in both quantitative and qualitative aspects, and to consider it the key task in army building. [passage omitted]

In order to do the job, we combined many methods and forms: We combined elementary and advanced training, in the country and abroad; on-the-job and in-school training; and short- and long-term courses, with urgent efforts being made to build a network of schools in the army covering from the National Defense Ministry to military regions, divisions, and provincial military units in order to train primary-level cadres and to provide midlevel cadres with advanced training and drills. Every year this network of schools supplied the army with thousands of cadres of all kinds, specialized in political, military, logistical, specialized, technical, and other matters. At the same time, every year we sent many people to fraternal countries, mainly to Vietnam and the Soviet Union, for training and long-term learning. Training courses or political activities were regularly held every year to promote an understanding of the situation and the revolutionary and military tasks, and to raise the leading, commanding, and managing capacity, as well as the moral qualities, of cadres at all levels in connection with their important role in improving themselves. The Vietnamese specialists and volunteer troops in Cambodia also made very large contributions to helping cadres in the Cambodian army to grow. [passage omitted]

In placing, stationing, and promoting cadres, we attached great importance to the key cadres. We selected senior cadres who had gone through challenges and had shown political qualities and good leading, commanding, and managing capacity to become key cadres, and at the same time boldly promoted and appointed young cadres having moral qualities and talent, and good potential growth. We were concerned about taking care of the material and spiritual living conditions of cadres and their families.

As our enemies were waging a psychological war and using sabotage to spoil our cadres and to destroy our organization, we set as goals for our cadres-related work actively training and protecting our cadres, protecting our organization, and ensuring a clean body of cadres. [passage omitted]

4. To strive to build and strengthen the army-people relationships and solidarity, and to consider it the source of our army's strength. [passage omitted]

We established hundreds of two-function companies in charge of both fighting the enemies and proselyting the people. In addition, all army units, no matter where they were stationed, had to have plans for taking part in mass proselyting, building the locations assigned to them as permanent base, and ensuring the existence of a good rear area. The results of the relationships and solidarity between the army and the people in the last 10 years were very great. The army made active contributions to building and consolidating the system of administration and mass organizations at all levels, as well as hamlets and villages; as a result, it helped to make the people's ownership position stronger everyday and the three revolutionary mass movements develop more strongly and widely everyday. On the part of the people, as they were aware of the responsibility for the task of defending the fatherland, they voluntarily sent hundreds of thousands of their children into the army. Hundreds of thousands of laborers did not mind hardship, difficulties, and dangers as they went to border areas to build defense lines, to serve the front line, to clear roads, to build fences around combat villages, and so on. The people contributed a lot of wealth to feeding the army. In addition, they also joined the army in fighting the enemies, protecting hamlets and villages, unmasking tens of thousands of enemy agents who had infiltrated their communities, and directly persuading tens of thousands of people in enemy ranks to return to the revolution. The people, along with the army, for the first time created a favorable combat situation in the people's war, in which the KPRAF served as the hard-core force. [passage omitted]

Although the relationships generally have been good, our army still has a number of weak aspects that in the time to come we must strive to overcome so as to continually consolidate and strengthen the army-people relationships.

5. To continue building strong basic-level units (battalions and companies) as the solid base for army building. [passage omitted]

The basic level is where cadres and soldiers are tested and trained; therefore, it also serves as the best source for training cadres and developing party members. Only when the basic level is strong can we build strong regiments, brigades, and divisions, and strong provincial and municipal military units, hence a strong army. Therefore, to build a strong basic level is a very important and urgent task in the building of strong KPRAF today.

Back in 1978, when we began to rebuild the revolutionary army with the first 21 battalions, the true nature of our work was to build basic-level units. That initial force since then has been supplying our army with so many

cadres and party members. A large number of them have become more mature and are now midlevel and high-ranking KPRAF cadres, with some of them now being members of the PRPK Central Committee. A large segment of the body of party and party committee members now in the KPRAF has come from those 21 battalions.

In the last 10 years, in the army-building task, except for building a number of main-force divisions and brigades, our main job was to build basic-level units in the three arms of the people's armed forces. In recent years, implementing the policy of the Central Military Commission on basic-level building, the National Defense Ministry organs and all divisions and provincial and municipal military units have gradually realized the importance of the basic level-building task and have sent many groups of cadres to local units in order to assume leadership over this task. These basic-level units have made initial changes, but generally speaking there still exist many weak aspects. [passage omitted]

6. To actively contribute to ceaselessly building and consolidating the special Cambodia-Vietnam-Laos solidarity and the Cambodia-Vietnam combat alliance, and to consider it an important factor in ensuring the maturity and growth of the KPRAF. [passage omitted]

After the day of liberation, the Cambodian revolutionary administration was immature and young, and right away it had to face serious threats, domestic and foreign. According to a treaty signed on 18 February 1979 by the PRK and the SRV, the Vietnamese volunteer troops continued to remain in the country to assist the Cambodian people and the KPRAF in the task of defending and building their fatherland. [passage omitted]

On their part, the army and people of Cambodia actively helped in many ways the Vietnamese volunteer troops and military specialists to properly fulfill their international obligation in Cambodia and made active contributions to defeating the enemy plot against the three Indochinese states and to consolidating and strengthening the position and power of the bloc of strategic and combat alliance among these states. [passage omitted]

In recent years, in order to contribute to ceaselessly building and consolidating the Cambodia-Vietnam solidarity and combat alliance, we did our very best to educate the Cambodian army to make it understand more and more profoundly the strategic significance of the Cambodia-Vietnam and Cambodia-Vietnam-Laos combat alliance bloc and the relationships between national tasks and international obligation, and to stress the spirit of self-help and self-reliance aimed at controlling one's own affairs. [passage omitted]

In the time to come, even after the Vietnamese volunteer army has completed its international obligation and gone home, we will always teach Cambodian troops, one batch after another, to profoundly understand the strategic value of this alliance so that each and every one of them would be fully aware of the need to contribute to consolidating and strengthening the Cambodia-Vietnam alliance to make it last forever.

We will make Cambodian troops, and every Cambodian citizen as well, thoroughly understand this statement full of affection and friendship that General Secretary Heng Samrin has made: "The Mekong River can dry up and the Truong Son Mountains can wear down, but the Cambodia-Vietnam friendship will remain forever green and forever strong." [passage omitted]

**Kadin Patron Says Trade With China Unlikely To Diminish**  
*BK0406091189 Jakarta ANTARA in English*  
*0744 GMT 4 Jun 89*

[Text] Jakarta, June 4 (OANA-ANTARA)—Sukamdani S. Gitosarjono, patron of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin), is of the opinion that the possible changes in the Central Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo would not hamper direct trade between Indonesia and China since leaders who would lead that country have been known by the Indonesian businessmen.

In an interview with ANTARA here over the weekend, Sukamdani expressed his optimism that the direct trade between Indonesia and China would not be hampered by the possible changes in the Chinese leadership.

He said that the Chinese leaders who would take over the leadership in Beijing have been loyal to Deng Xiaoping.

He cited as an example, the Chinese deputy prime minister for economic affairs, the former Chinese foreign minister and other Chinese economic leaders, who have already had dialogues with executives of Kadin in the framework of stepping up direct trade between the two nations.

He further reaffirmed that the direct trade between the two countries would have a bright prospect in the future since the two Asian nations have interdependency on their respective commodities.

The People's Republic of China is in badly need of plywood, cement, fertilizer, steel sheet and crude palm oil (CPO) from Indonesia, while Indonesia buys soybean, coal, cotton, corn and agricultural machineries from PRC.

Indonesia's export value to China in the last four years was recorded at U.S. \$958.87 million, while its import value from China was noted at U.S. \$1,324.08 million, or a deficit of U.S. \$365.21 million for Indonesia.

"But the Chinese deputy minister for economic and trade relations said in Beijing in mid 1988 that China has suffered a deficit of U.S. \$770 million from 1985 to June 1988," Sukamdani added.

According to him, the Chinese businessmen have a great interest in establishing direct trade with Indonesia, marked by the increasing visits by Chinese delegations to Indonesia.

Since August 1985 more than 800 Indonesian businessmen have visited China, while the Chinese businessmen who came to Indonesia during that period reached a total of 1,500 people.

Sukamdani, who has been observing recent developments in China, called on the Kadin's China committee to reconsider the Indonesian participation in the Beijing Fair scheduled for next July due to uncertain situation in that country.

He admitted that Indonesia's participation in the fair is very important in an effort to support the government program to boost exports of non-oil/gas commodities. He also hoped that the Indonesian consulate general in Hong Kong should be able to continuously monitor recent developments in China in order to facilitate Indonesian businessmen to follow the current situation in that country.

**Suharto Opens ASEAN Information Ministers Conference**  
*BK2405103689 Jakarta ANTARA in English*  
*1002 GMT 24 May 89*

[Excerpt] Jakarta, May 24 (OANA-ANTARA)—ASEAN should also make an effort to correct the imbalance of news flow, which has been more in favour of the advanced countries and a disadvantage to the developing nations, President Suharto has said.

"The fact shows that the developing countries, including ASEAN, are still flocked by news which only benefit the advanced nations and harm the developing nations' image," the head of state said when officially opening the two-day first conference of ASEAN ministers responsible for information at the presidential office here Wednesday [24 May].

Such a situation is obviously unfair and must be corrected, he added in the opening ceremony attended also by Vice President Sudharmono.

The struggle to correct the imbalance is an important part of the endeavour to materialize a more adjusted new world order in the political and economic sectors.

Talking about the steps Indonesia has taken so far, the president said that Indonesia has developed a free and responsible press system.

The press in one hand has to disseminate information, and on the other hand has the right to exercise a social control.

Therefore, the president hoped the conference would provide an effective means for the exchange of experience and for studying the successes of the individual member countries in the dissemination of information for their development. [passage omitted]

**Minister Explains Establishment of Plywood Marketing Boards**  
42130095 Jakarta *KOMPAS* in Indonesian  
15 Apr 89 p 2

[Summary] At a press conference and meeting with plywood manufacturers on 14 April, Trade Minister Arifin Siregar stated that plywood joint marketing boards were established to prevent unfair competition among exporters by setting export volumes and controlling supply. Without such a council, he said, foreign buyers can set their own prices, which could lead to cut-throat competition among Indonesian manufacturers. Therefore, according to Bob Hasan, chairman of the Indonesian Wood Panel Association, a unified sales price must be set to avoid price variation throughout the country resulting from differences in transportation costs.

Indonesian plywood has captured a worldwide market, making it a very profitable non-oil export commodity. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, plywood exports in 1988 were valued at \$2.88 billion, compared to \$993.7 million in 1984.

**Minister, Party Officials Comment on Forthcoming PPP Congress**  
42130088b Jakarta *MERDEKA* in Indonesian  
4 May 89 p 5

[Text] Jakarta, ANGKATAN BERSENJATA—Minister of Home Affairs [MENDAGRI] Rudini hopes that the divisions in the DPP [Central Executive Council] of the PPP (Development Unity Party) can be resolved immediately through consultation and consensus based on patience and charity.

"In this way, I hope the PPP congress will be successful, for the good of the PPP itself," the MENDAGRI said in reply to questions from reporters in his office yesterday, Wednesday, afternoon. In the morning, the MENDAGRI had received a visit from the PPP Congress II Committee, accompanied by Drs Mardinsyah, secretary-general of the PPP DPP. Congress Committee Chairman Mahdi Tjokroaminoto submitted plans for the congress, which is to be held from 28 to 30 August.

Rudini said that what has happened in the PPP DPP, like the existence of two congress committees, is an internal PPP affair, and he hoped it can be resolved immediately. He stated that the committee directed by PPP DPP General Chairman H.J. Naro and Secretary-General Mardinsyah has been officially recognized in accordance with legal and constitutional principles.

As supervisor of domestic politics, Rudini hoped that the PPP congress will run smoothly and successfully. He hoped the congress will be able to finalize draft corrections to the AD/ART [constitution/by-laws] in accordance with Law 3 of 1985 on Political Parties and GOLKAR.

The minister also hoped that a system for holding congresses can be formulated to enable a congress to be implemented successfully and in an orderly way.

Responding to a reporter's question on the forthcoming election of the general chairman of the PPP DPP, the minister said he hoped the election will be democratic and will use a collective nominating method rather than a single nominator. The nominating group should include members of the old DPP and regional delegates.

With regard to regional delegates who attend the congress, Rudini said the matter was entirely up to the party. As supervisor of domestic politics, he will give the same assistance he gave to the PDI [Indonesian Democratic Party] Congress and the GOLKAR MUNAS [National Conference].

"Thus, I am willing to send telegrams to all governors asking them to help with the travel of the regional delegates," he asserted. He added that the party itself will determine who the regional delegates will be.

Rudini hoped that the congress will be held simply and efficiently without reducing its significance. It should also use methods that are more mature and democratic, so that the PPP can make contribution to current political developments.

**Up to the PPP**

On Wednesday afternoon [3 May], the PPP DPP called on all echelons of the sociopolitical organization to make a success of PPP Congress II, which is scheduled to be held in Jakarta at the end of August.

"Prevent any action that could reduce the significance and image of our congress," PPP DPP Secretary-General Mardinsyah said in reply to a reporter's question at the DPR [Parliament] building at Senayan, Jakarta.

He added that people inside or outside of the PPP organization who have a question should discuss it immediately with DPP leaders.

When asked about the future of the opposition committee, Mardinsyah stated that the DPP knows only that such a committee exists.

When pressed to say what action the PPP DPP will take if its call is not heeded by other groups, Mardinsyah replied that "it will be up to the DPP to decide."

Mahdi Tjokroaminoto added that the sanctions imposed on violators of organizational discipline will depend upon the seriousness of the violations.

When asked whether the violation committed by the "shadow" conference committee could be categorized as serious, he said, "It's up to the DPP."

### Position of Jakarta Regional Council

Meanwhile, on Wednesday, Dr H.M. Djufrie, AS SKM [Masters Degree in Public Health received in the United States], chairman of the PPP Regional Council for Jakarta, stated that he and all DPC's [branch executive councils] in Jakarta support the PPP DPP Congress II Committee formed by Mrs Aisyah Amini.

"What we want is a committee that is able to hold Congress II so that it will create a new DPP and make other decisions that meet expectations," Djufrie asserted.

These expectations, he declared, include the hope that the future DPP will put the party in a positive position and will not provoke suspicion on the part of anyone.

"Yes, like what is written in President Suharto's autobiography," he asserted.

In order to achieve this, he continued, the PPP must be able to integrate itself completely with national life by consistently putting into practice Pancasila, the UUD 1945 [1945 Constitution], and the GBHN [Broad Outline of State Policy].

Another expectation, he said, is that the DPP must be able to make the party a mechanism for absorbing and channeling the aspirations of the people and for cooperating to the maximum with the government and other New Order forces in the implementation of development.

He added that the DPP must be able to manage the party so that it becomes a party of agreement, peace, and calm, so that party members will be able to work and make achievements in the interests of the nation and the state.

"Members of the party have never been in agreement, have they?" he asked.

The Conference II Committee formed by Mrs Aisyah Amini appointed H. Ismail Hasan Matareum, SH [Master of Laws], as leader of the committee.

### Armed Forces Commander on News Presentation, Media

BK0106165989 Jakarta ANTARA in English  
0946 GMT 1 Jun 89

[Text] Jakarta, June 1 (OANA-ANTARA)—Armed Forces Commander General Try Sutrisno Thursday called on the Indonesian press to avoid the publication of dichotomic, antagonistic and insinuating news stories.

Gen. Tri Sutrisno said there has been a tendency among the mass media of late to carry dichotomic, antagonistic and insinuating news stories or information.

"If this unhealthy tendency is let to continue it will clearly harm the growth and development of the national press," he said Thursday.

Therefore, the National Press Society needs to have determination, courage and good-will to continuously keep spreading news stories which are healthy, fresh and constructive, he said at the opening of a press hall at the Armed Forces Headquarters.

A maintained national resilience, which is the positive impact of press coverage, will revive the spirit of the people to implement development programs for the realization of a better life in the future, the head of the Coordinating Board for National Stability (Bakorstanas) [Sentence as received].

Pancasila press is a means of struggle to meet the national goals that it has to carry out its functions as an objective information distributor, a constructive social-control agent and an accurate channel of aspirations, Gen. Tri said.

In reply to a question Gen. Tri said that a *pancasila* press is different from a liberal press.

Dramatization in news reporting, which is considered good in the liberal press, is not so good in *pancasila* press because it is against the Indonesian culture, he said.

"A good material, if it is produced at a wrong moment, will be bad. Timing, accuracy and correctness are the challenges of the press society. This is the hint I give to the people for implementation," he said.

He admitted that the degree of antagonism and insinuation in the news coverage has not been so worrying although it must call for awareness.

In reply to a question Gen. Try said that the sending of Indonesian police officers to Namibia to safeguard the general elections in that country next year will be conducted at the end of this year.

About the number, he said that it was still under process.

"They asked us and we provided. Our police officers have had experience in securing general elections. Such a request is not the first met by the Armed Forces," he said.

### Economy Advancing But Still Slowest in ASEAN 42130088c Jakarta KOMPAS in Indonesian 7 May 89 p 5

[Editorial: "Indonesian Economy Advances, But Is Still Left Behind"]

[Text] Indonesian economic growth is on the rise, but it is still the lowest among ASEAN states. This is the conclusion we draw from a report by the Asian Development Bank, headquartered in Manila.

We intentionally make this comparison, for in this way we will be able to build a healthy and positive attitude. On the one hand, we are encouraged because we have made progress, while on the other hand we continue to recognize our own situation, for our economic growth is the lowest in comparison to the five other ASEAN states.

We need this attitude very much. Our success in overcoming the problems and challenges we face actually depends on our having such an attitude.

What we most often hear from reports and evaluations by various international economic bodies and foreign economic observers are very positive assessments of the advances we have made.

We are pleased to hear them because, as a nation working hard to improve the livelihood of the common people, we need enthusiasm, optimism, and a feeling of capability.

Our capability is proved by the results of development, not only as determined by macro measurements such as growth, export volumes, balance of payments, and per capita income, but also my measurements that are more in the context of society, such as infant mortality, the health of preschool children, and levels of adequacy in meeting basic needs.

Reference is often made to Indonesia's experience in utilizing the profits of the "golden age of oil prices" to build facilities to enable it to become self-sufficient in rice. It then established facilities, systems, institutions, and capabilities as a stronger foundation for continuance of development.

The amount of Indonesia's foreign loans grew, becoming the largest debt in ASEAN and number four in the world. With falling oil prices and reevaluation of foreign currencies, we found the payment of debt installments to be a heavy burden.

The ability and desire to pay debts remained unchanged, however, for, unlike Brazil, Mexico, or Venezuela, for example, the debts were carefully managed at the time loans were made and when they were used.

We have made achievements, as also recorded by the Asian Development Bank, through our ability and desire to seek and stimulate exports other than oil and natural gas, with the result that proceeds for 1 month exceed \$1 billion.

If we compare the present with 23 years ago, we find a higher level of economic life.

Now, through the Asian Development Bank's report, we get material for other comparisons, not with our own conditions 23 years ago and not with Western industrialized countries, but with fellow ASEAN nations.

From these comparisons, we learn that, although we have been able to make great advances, our position in economic growth, expansion of exports, and per capita income remains the lowest.

Why do we record these comparisons, and what lessons do we want to learn from these comparisons with other ASEAN countries?

We learn that Indonesia is not the only one making strides and spurring ahead. Neighboring countries and other countries in this region are doing likewise. Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, and, especially, Singapore are also pursuing and achieving progress.

We learn that the challenges in our future are still serious, and that commitment and determination to proceed with development remain greatly needed. Our success in development does not make us proud and forgetful of our situation, but it gives us great enthusiasm and growing confidence in the nation's capabilities.

We learn that we must benefit from the experience of our neighbor countries as to what makes their growth greater and faster than ours and what obstacles we must avoid and eliminate.

We note that all ASEAN countries have instituted deregulation policies that are more comprehensive, not merely by eliminating obstructive licenses and procedures but by simultaneously eliminating or guiding to a minimal level everything that hinders and that creates a high cost economy.

In the language of politics it is said that deregulation also means the reduction, or the placing at a minimal level, of instances of misuse of authority by the bureaucracy, government, or private sector.

We learn how funds, which we generally consider to be utilized adequately, must be used at more efficient and productive levels.

This means that we, whether the government or the private sector, will continue to be careful, and be even more careful, in taking out loans. We will also be careful as to the priorities of the projects for which these limited funds are used.

We also understand that Indonesia has the largest population and island territory of the ASEAN countries. Dimensions of population, diversity, and size of national territory affect the pace of development, as measured by efficiency and productivity.

We therefore learn how we can divide the large dimensions into small ones that can be better controlled and that can better stimulate the potential of the people. We can do this by giving greater emphasis to regional development and by being more consistent in implementing decentralization and deconcentration.

Finally, we will observe and study more carefully what factors make us advance, and what factors hinder us.

The government will open its eyes, ears, and heart more. On the other hand, the people, with good intentions and a sense of responsibility, will want to provide more input, oversight, and correction.

**Domestic Plastics Industry Dependent on Imports**  
42130088a Jakarta *SUARA KARYA* in Indonesian  
2 May 89 p 4

[Text] Jakarta, SUARA KARYA—Although there is an increasing need for finished plastics products, the domestic plastics industry is still facing a number of challenges. One quite serious challenge is the problem of the availability of raw materials. In reality, only 28 percent of the raw materials used to make finished plastics products can be produced in Indonesia.

Yesterday, Monday, Engr Achmad Sarbini, general chairman of the Indonesian Plastics Industry Association (APINDO), mentioned the subject of imported raw materials for Indonesian plastics products during his short explanation of business developments in the Indonesian plastics industry. Together with Axel Gerberding, head of Business Services of the Indonesia-Germany Economic Association (EKONID), he explained plans

for holding the "K-89 International Trade Exhibition for Plastics and Rubber," to take place in Dusseldorf, West Germany, from 2 to 9 November 1989.

Although Sarbini did not specifically mention the availability of plastics raw materials as a serious problem, his statements picturing dependence on imports appeared to cause considerable "surprise." He explained that 72 percent of all needed plastics raw materials must still be imported. This volume is equivalent to 400,000 tons, and, if each ton of raw materials costs about \$1,400, dependency on imports drains \$560 million in foreign exchange every year.

Sarbini also stated, however, that the deregulation climate created by a number of regulations has increasingly touched the plastics industry. Some new government regulations, Sarbini said, are no longer obstacles to importing raw materials for plastics.

Raw materials that must still be imported to meet the demands of the plastics industry in Indonesia include polyethylene, polypropylene, and polystyrene. These three types of raw materials are much needed by the plastics industry in Indonesia. According to SUARA KARYA records, of the 300,000 tons of polypropylene and the 40,400 tons of polystyrene required every year, only 4,000 tons and 14,000 tons, respectively, can be produced domestically.

Some circles say that dependency on raw material imports, besides hindering smooth production, also affects domestic plastics prices. Furthermore, economic fluctuations in supplier countries also have great effect.

**USSR-Aided Bridge Under Construction in Pakse**  
*42060057a Vientiane PASASON in Lao 27 Apr 89 p 1*

[Excerpts] The Pakse District administrative authorities have joined with the people to build a bridge across the Houai Gnang River between Ban Ke and Pho Tak.

The bridge will be 54 meters long, 3.2 meters wide and up to international standards with a life span of 100 years. Its load capacity will be 80 tons and will be built with steel-reinforced concrete. The total construction cost will be 29,457,636.33 kip. Assistance is coming from Bridge Construction Unit 3 and from Soviet experts who are not charging for the design work. The schedule for completion is set at 120 days from the date construction begins. [passage omitted] The agreement called for construction start on 15 April 1989; in fact it began on 8 April. Various companies and stores have given assistance: more than 7 tons of cement and more than 1 million kip.

**Houa Phan Firm Signs Agreement With SRV Factory**

*42060056d Vientiane PASASON in Lao 24 Apr 89 p 1*

[Text] (KPL) Recently, representatives of the Houa Phan Province transport company and the 19 May Factory of Thanh Hoa Province, SRV, signed an agreement to expand cooperations from now until 1990. This primarily involves training technical cadres and producing motor vehicle spare parts. It also calls for cooperation in building a motor vehicle, motorcycle, and bicycle repair service facility in Sam Neua District.

**Oudomsai Plans 1.7 Billion Kip in Exports; Illegalities Noted**

*42060058b Vientiane PASASON in Lao 12 Apr 89 p 1*

[Excerpts] (KPL) This year, Oudomsai Province will increase its exports to be worth more than 1.7 billion kip. For the most part, this means exports of sesame, tobacco, garlic, cotton, cardamom, coffee, sticklac, resin, and wood products.

The province administrative committee reports that in order to reach this objective, the province will try to upgrade and strengthen its trade network and to increase two-way trade services, making them more effective. It is also necessary to upgrade the trade enterprises, bringing them into line with the economic management mechanism set out by the party and the state. [passage omitted].

A province administrator also reported that during the past year, the province's trade operations were not very strong and there were imbalances in income receipts that in 1988 amounted to approximately 670 million kip because the organization and management of these operations were not done well. Their activities tended to be rather freewheeling and illegal. Some trade enterprises' improper operations involved failure to register, failure

to pay taxes, and failure to have plans. Thus, the total receipts from trade did not serve the three interests, and most of them benefitted only individuals.

**Finance Ministry Sources on Debt Limit Boost**

*42070089c Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai  
3 Apr 89 pp 1,16*

[Unattributed report: "Finance Requests an Increase in the Debt Ceiling To Support Increased Investment"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] A report from the Finance Ministry revealed that on 4 April the Finance Ministry will recommend that the Council of Ministers consider an increase in the ceiling on foreign debt from the former ceiling of not more than 1 billion dollars to 1.2 billion dollars because the country needs to expand economic services in order to support an expansion of investment so that the economic system will expand at an appropriate rate.

The report stated that this increase in the foreign debt ceiling was being considered with regard to its effect on the stability of the economy since external factors were still very uncertain, for example there was trade obstruction, international interest rates showed a tendency to rise, and exchange rates were uncertain. In addition the price of oil on the world market affected the balance of payments and currency reserves and so could have the effect of reducing economic independence in the next 2 to 3 years.

The Finance Ministry will also submit a plan for changing the uses of foreign debt for budget year 1989. Before the increase in the foreign debt ceiling, \$999.44 million had been budgeted for 16 primary projects and \$1,019.24 million for 28 secondary projects. After the increase there are to be 17 primary projects totalling \$1,192.30 million, an increase of \$192.86 million, and 23 secondary projects totalling \$886.23 million.

The report revealed that the \$192.86 million increase in funds for primary projects consisted of changes in funding for eight projects for which loan contracts had already been signed; the original amount was \$399.66 million which was increased \$34.58 million to \$434.24 million. In addition there were increases in funds for major projects for which loans had already been contracted to compensate for exchange rate changes and to be in line with actual expenditures; these increases amounted to \$88.35 million and included increases due to changes in exchange rates of \$1.96 million.

The report stated that the \$86.39 million in changes due to changes in expenses involved loans to the Electrical Generating Authority for four projects: part one of the project to develop the electrical system increased from \$115 million to \$165.73 million, the project to build unit 10 of the Maemo lignite-burning power plant changed

from \$17.25 million to \$16.14 million, and the project to build unit three, part one of the Bangpakong thermal-electric plant changed from \$73.46 million to \$72.15 million.

The additional increase of \$69.93 million involved the changing of three secondary projects which were ready to start and were of increased importance into primary

projects: the project of the Telephone Organization of Thailand to acquire communications equipment with bids at international prices, \$36.91 million; the project to improve and expand the Chonburi Water Works of the Provincial Water Works Authority, \$11.19 million; and the project to build section three of the thermal-electric plant of the Electrical Generating Authority, \$21.83 million.

**Paper on Berjasa Pullout From Barisan Nasional**  
*BK0606091589 Kuala Lumpur BERITA HARIAN in Malay 30 May 89 p 10*

[Editorial: "Berjasa's Decision Is Not Surprising"]

[Text] The news about Berjasa [United Islamic Front of Malaysia] pulling out from Barisan Nasional [BN] was not a surprise to anyone. Berjasa party leaders themselves probably did not expect that its pullout from BN would attract political observers' attention. It is a well-known fact that Berjasa was not an influential component of BN and this resulted in the party being inactive. As the party has no representative in parliament or in the state legislative council, Berjasa's participation in BN has not, in any way, affected BN's membership.

It is easy to understand the reason behind Berjasa's pullout. Similar to PAS' [Pan Malaysian Islamic Party] splinter party, Hamim [Muslim Front of Malaysia], Berjasa is constantly weak and in difficulties. As a party that emerged due to a crisis between BN and PAS, its existence was not contributive to any form of struggle or political ideology. From the political perspective, Berjasa should not be disappointed if it was considered BN's "errand boy". The party's destiny lay with BN, as it was BN that approved its existence.

Berjasa was uneasy when BN accepted Hamim into its fold during the 1986 general elections. Barisan Nasional brushed aside Berjasa's protest against this decision, and as a result Berjasa did not participate in the 1986 general elections. Since then, the party leaders and members constantly made repulsive statements against the BN leaders. Simultaneously, the party started to collaborate with the opposition; this was clearly observed during the recent Parti Jawa and Ampang Jaya parliamentary by-elections. Berjasa's open support to the opposition candidates indicated that it was ungrateful to BN for its existence and dependency.

Berjasa's historical development indicated that it continuously depended on BN. With a membership of about 150,000, the party did not contribute much to BN. Due

to its small membership, it could not voice its opinions strongly or make any demands from BN. The reason Berjasa decided to opt out of BN was probably because it realized its own weaknesses. The reason given by Berjasa president, Datuk Haji Wan Hashim Wan Ahmad—that there was no harmony in BN—was only a lame excuse. As BN has no desire to expel any of its components, Berjasa was then forced to make its decision to pull out of BN.

The issue that political observers probably want to watch will be Berjasa's ability to contribute to Angkatan Perpaduan Ummah [APU, People's Solidarity Movement], which is in the process of registration. The absence of high-caliber leaders in Berjasa and the protest by several states against the decision to establish the new movement will probably leave Berjasa out of APU. It can be predicted that Berjasa's fate in APU will be worse than that when it was in BN. It is probably due to this reason that its branch in Terengganu did not approve of the party leaders' decision to pull out of BN, and the branch will continue to support BN in the upcoming Teluk Pasu parliamentary by-election. The protest lodged by the Berjasa branch in Terengganu proved that Berjasa's decision to pull out of BN was undemocratic.

Berjasa's decision to collaborate with the UMNO [United Malays National Organization] and PAS splinter groups indicated that the party's current struggle is directed toward the holding of general elections. This decision is considered good for Berjasa, which is left with no capital for the general elections. By collaborating with the UMNO splinter group, it probably hopes that the cost of its participation in the general elections will be borne by its ally. It is similar with PAS, which is willing to accept the dejected splinter UMNO group members, even though they were once its mortal enemies. The outcome of the three groups' action will be known in the next general elections. The upcoming 24 June Teluk Pasu parliamentary by-election cannot be used as a yardstick to measure the strength of the three groups because Teluk Pasu is PAS' stronghold. Based on this fact, the outcome from that parliamentary by-election should not be linked to Berjasa's decision to pull out of Barisan Nasional.

**Central Bank Chief Warns of 'Overheating' Economy**  
*BK2605034989 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English*  
*26 May 89 p 17*

[Text] Bank of Thailand Governor Kamchon Sathirakun said yesterday that boosting Thailand's economic growth should be carried out cautiously in order to avoid overheating.

Mr Kamchon said measures to bridge the savings-investment gap, to improve infrastructure and to further develop the labour force were all necessary to boost growth potential.

Thailand, he said at the first of a two-day World Economic Forum seminar, needed to answer three questions: "Where are we now? Where do we hope to be? And how we will get there?"

He said the question "where we are now?" could only be answered by the favourable statistics, including the record growth rate of over 10 percent last year. The industrialisation programme has also advanced rapidly through government endorsement of the Eastern Seaboard developments.

Mr Kamchon said it was possible that Thailand had reached a crucial transition in its development.

"The growth rate for 1989 is projected to be at least 8 percent and the non-agricultural sector is projected to grow by approximately 9 percent," he said.

"We must take advantage of this favourable time to assess ourselves, to identify the issues which deserve our special attention and, finally, to concentrate our efforts on further strengthening the economy. It's time now to ask ourselves what more can be done, and then to do it promptly."

In an overheated economy like Thailand's spending usually exceeds savings, he said.

"To bridge this gap, we must approach both savings and investments simultaneously."

Measures to mobilise savings are being implemented without discrimination across all sectors, including the Government, the state enterprises and private business, he said.

Strict fiscal discipline continues to be emphasised in the government sector and state enterprises are being guided towards increased profits, through efficient management. They are also encouraged to explore the possibility of privatisation for the purpose of capital augmentation.

Foreign investment, he said, both direct and portfolio, was welcome to reduce the need for borrowing abroad.

"Projects which stand a better chance of promotion are those which offer technology transfer and competitive advantages."

Although the critical times for financial institutions are over, "we are continuing to further enhance their efficiency."

To expand their role in mobilising savings, "we are now pressing for more market instruments and encouraging them, through our credit policy, to channel resources to finance investment in productive sectors".

In addition to narrowing the savings-investment gap, he said Thailand was working on two other main issues: improving infrastructure and developing labour.

Mr Kamchon said the benefits of high growth rates must be spread to as many areas as possible.

**Drugs, Cigarette Trade Issues Draw Comment**

**MP on Drug Patent Protection**  
*42070089a Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN in Thai* 2-8 Apr 89 pp 10, 11

[Interview with Chaturon Chaisaeng: "This Is Not Something for the Government Alone To Handle, the People Also Should Be Aware of It"]

[Text] [SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN] Should we yield to the wishes of the United States because we fear the impact of provision 301? What is your view?

[Chaturon Chaisaeng] Past deliberations have indicated that changing the copyright law or coming up with a temporary measure to have the effect of a law would cause damage in the thousands and millions of baht.

The United States is the largest producer of drugs in the world. If we take measures which allow the United States alone to monopolize drug production, drugs will become expensive. We will not be able to develop or produce drugs. Because we will have to buy from the United States alone, producers in other countries will be affected also. If drugs become many times more expensive, this change will involve many thousands and millions of baht, but the effects we would suffer from provision 301 of the new trade act would be similar. We have not been able to estimate the effect of the act, but it could not be much different from the losses from changing the patent law for drugs or instituting a similar temporary measure.

[SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN] It seems that if we yield to the United States on drugs, we cannot be certain that they will not try something else.

[Chaturon Chaisaeng] This situation is like that with G.S.P. Provision 301 has not been applied to Thailand before. G.S.P. and provision 301 are related in that no matter what we do with regard the United States, they

can use either G.S.P. or provision 301 to pressure us or as a basis for negotiations since the measures they employ can include trade restrictions, raising tariffs and various penalties. These measures result when someone complains to the U.S. Special Trade Representative. For example if someone complains that Thailand is being unfair to the United States in some way then they would resort to provision 301 regarding patents as one course of action.

[SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN] Do you think there is any group in Thailand which would gain if we yielded to the wishes of the United States?

[Chaturon Chaisaeng] Yielding to the United States to avoid U.S. trade restrictions would be advantageous to some Thai exporters or those selling to the United States because measures employed by the United States include quotas, tariffs and penalties when they think something is wrong. Therefore when measures are taken, it is to someone's disadvantage. No matter whether it involves a quota or an import tariff, it will hurt exporters. Therefore the inclination to yield to U.S. demands will be inspired by pressure from exporters.

[SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN] What position do you think the Thai government should take?

[Chaturon Chaisaeng] I think it would be impossible to say what it should be for any particular time because there will be new developments regularly. There will be new demands, and there will be measures taken to exert pressure for changes. Therefore we will not be able to make a definite response which will end this situation by yielding to them on one point or another. The measures used to pressure and the demands or threats will change constantly. An advantageous approach for us to take would be to release the data and the facts about the consequences if we were to make changes for the United States, about the consequences of U.S. measures against Thailand such as G.S.P. or provision 301, what would be affected by these measures, the monetary effect of the measures, and the losses caused to labor, to markets, and the development of trade and technology so that decisions could be made. This should not be an internal matter for the government alone; the people should be made aware also so that they understand its importance and would understand immediately the effect of any U.S. measure taken against Thailand. For example, suppose they imposed a tariff - how much would it cost. If they imposed a quota and we could not export, production would stop, work would stop, and labor would be affected. We must know what the effects will be, and in addition we should tell the people. If we change the patent laws for drugs, how many drugs will become more expensive and how much will it cost per year. These calculations will allow us to respond to the demands of the United States; they will indicate how much we should yield and how much we should get in return. If the exchange is satisfactory, we should accept. Since this is all an attempt by the United States to correct

an internal problem, namely a severe trade imbalance, by shifting the burden to other countries including Thailand, Thailand will inevitably be affected; it will be forced to accept the burden and will have problems. We should do what we can to give up as little as possible. Therefore we must make careful comparisons, which has not yet been done. The figures which have been released have caused misunderstanding. For example, does trade between Thailand and the United States amount to 50 billion or has it increased to 70 to 80 billion. These figures are not relevant. In fact they are not relevant to the gains or losses which will occur.

#### Editorial Scores U.S.

42070089a Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 1 Apr 89 p 3

[Unattributed editorial: "Encouraging Investment Is Penalized"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Superficially it does not seem important, but this is a buyers market—the power of the buyer is greater than that of the seller. The United States has used tariff increases as a weapon against all the countries mentioned. If the Thai experience is analyzed, Thailand has been hit hard by our big friend, the United States, with two kinds of tariffs on Thai ball bearings. Thailand was clearly targeted. All countries were not hit equally. Thailand was hit hard and may be hit again.

But what is remarkable is that all Thai exports to the United States were hit. This is because America is making all the calculations concerning Thai export subsidies. There is a Thai law encouraging investment, and there is an office for encouraging investment in Thai production, for example, advantages are given to investors who import machinery, raw materials are not taxed, taxes are returned on exports, electricity costs are reduced, individual income taxes are reduced and many other benefits. America says that Thai subsidies amount to 19 percent. Singapore is much better at evasion; their subsidies are calculated to be 2.34 percent.

This will cause great losses for Thailand, and our great friend, America, will be responsible. It will cause the Thai economy to collapse even further. If other areas of the world and other great nations which employ protectionist measures come to the same conclusions as America and treat Thailand in the same way, the economic disintegration will occur immediately.

The government still has the opportunity to suggest to America that if it still has interests in Asia and if the balance of power is still necessary, then it should reevaluate its role with Thailand.

**Editorial Criticizes U.S. on Cigarettes**  
42070089a Bangkok THAI RAT in Thai 17 Mar 89 p 3  
[Unattributed editorial: "America Pushes Death"]

[Excerpts] The American government in this century has been a real example for governments throughout the world. The lives of every American are very precious, and the government tries to protect them as much as possible; it makes every attempt to stop smoking, and this has been effective in reducing cigarette consumption by 11 percent because people realized that persisting in smoking was like dying little by little. But Asians are not Americans and so the U.S. government uses all the pressure it can to export cigarettes here. It does not matter who dies here as long as Americans make money.

Because its bargaining power was superior to that of its opponents, America was successful in forcing Japan, Korea and Taiwan to open their markets to American cigarettes even while it tried every public relations technique to stop smoking in the United States because of cancer and death. The next target was clearly to argue

their way into selling cigarettes in Thailand; the U.S. government forced Thailand to accept this by threatening [provision] 301 of the Trade Act if Thailand did not accept the poison.

It is very unfortunate that details of the Thai - U.S. trade talks, regardless of the problem of intellectual property and other problems, were not revealed to the public. This had the effect of reducing Thai bargaining power a great deal. This was clear when Thailand gave in on cigarettes. The Thai people learned of this when Mr Pramuan Saphawasu, the Minister of Finance, revealed that he was cornered and would have to give in to the United States even though it was not right that death was sent to the Thai instead of the Americans while they made money from it. [passage omitted]

We would like to ask America if Thailand, which is concerned about poor people in the far countryside sympathizing with the low income Lao and Burmese along the Thai border, were to become weak, would Americans smoke very inexpensive marijuana and not die because they did not have a surgeon general to tell them that it could cause death.

## POLITICAL

### Ethics, Economy Included in Premier Do Muoi's Interview

42090242 Hanoi DAI DOAN KET in Vietnamese  
25 Feb-3 Mar pp 1, 4

[Interview: "Council of Ministers Chairman Do Muoi Answers Questions in Interview Granted to DAI DOAN KET"]

[Text] [DAI DOAN KET] In the last few years, in addition to the fact that the country's economic situation had many difficulties, economic management remained weak and poor, and social order and political security showed complicated development, there have appeared in society signs of a worrisome and even alarming decline of ethical values. Do you have any opinion about this observation?

[Chairman Do Muoi] I think that the 6th National Congress of Party Delegates had the same observation. Although so far the socioeconomic situation has not yet escaped the state of crisis, particularly with inflation remaining serious, in many other aspects there have been encouraging initial changes. Although in 1987 serious crop losses occurred and in 1988 natural disasters caused a loss of 800,000 tons, grain production in the country as a whole still reached the 19 million-ton mark. The market has responded better to the people's needs in terms of supplies of meats, fish, beans, vegetables, fruits, and so on. Consumer goods were more available on the market. During the recent Tet (lunar new year) holidays, throughout the country we no longer had any waiting lines. The value of export in 1988 was 1 billion rubles-dollars, an increase of 17 percent over 1987. The fact that the production of electric power, cement, fertilizers, and so on has increased is favorably affecting the implementation of the three economic programs. There has been much progress in connection with social order and political security. The party leadership and state management having to do with the economy and with open extension of democracy in all aspects of social life have made progress because much experience was obtained in practical activities at the basic level. Foreign policy based on the new thinking is bringing about good results.

Only by carefully monitoring changes in the reality can we correctly assess the situation, particularly since we need to correctly assess the positive factors that are appearing in increasing frequency in the people's movement in order to strengthen the confidence of cadres, party members, and the people. In those localities where we pay attention to improving the living conditions of working people and show our concern about ideological work, there are good changes in terms of political, ideological, and ethical awareness. Naturally, as I said earlier, the positive changes are only the beginning and we should not be excessively optimistic. Difficulties in various aspects remain critical.

About human ethics, the situation still is serious, for there are things like violating labor discipline, pursuing money, being corrupt and receiving bribes, speculating and leading a parasitic life, wasting public properties, living lavishly and indulging in debauchery; cringing and flattering, and disregarding the law.

Such declines in moral standards are serious and deserve our being worried and alarmed. The press should take a more active part in building the revolutionary morality and the new socialist man.

I want to bring to your attention the fact that because the majority of our working people, soldiers, and cadres have gone through many challenges, they will be able to maintain confidence, moral standards, and a wholesome way of living in the face of difficulties and to actively carry out the renovating task from the position that they hold. Many people have brilliantly fulfilled the tasks they were assigned on the economic, cultural, and social fronts, as well as the security and national defense tasks and international obligation. This is the strong support for the socialist revolution in our country. The major question that is being raised has to do with the fact that the force which is to play this decisive role is yet to receive appropriate care and to be fully developed so as to drive back all negative manifestations and to push forward the renovating task in our country to make it progress more quickly.

[DAI DOAN KET] There exists at the present time a situation in which the new ethical standards have not yet been established very firmly, and the moral traditions and cultural life of the nation are being eroded and even destroyed which creates quite a great deal of adverse effects on building a new morality and the new socialist man.

In order to overcome the above-mentioned shortcomings, what measures should we have in the short and long terms while we still have many difficulties in our economy and society?

[Chairman Do Muoi] I think that man's ethics and cultural living are greatly affected by the socioeconomic situation.

Only when the socioeconomic policies of the party and state are implemented can we create favorable conditions for all people in society to have jobs, and for blue- and white-collar workers to have a decent life, and thus make them feel reassured and encouraged as they work unselfishly for the country. Only by creating favorable conditions for people to have jobs and for all working people to lead a decent life can we build the new ethics on a solid foundation. But we also must realize that man's morality and way of living are to be built also through education in family, school, and society. We must pay attention not only to education starting from infancy but also to teachers. I would like to address you members of the press, through this interview with DAI

DOAN KET, and to say that we must patiently use propaganda and education to teach the scientific outlook on life patterned after Marxism-Leninism and combined with the nation's wholesome moral traditions. We must build the concept of being industrious and thrifty, and devoting oneself to the common good, and make everybody understand that working is part of the human nature and a sacred obligation to society. We must affirm that our socialist ethics are those of the working people who are aware of their ownership right, have compassion for others as for themselves, and show real patriotism combined with a love for proletarian internationalism.

We must pay attention to educating people about the interests and obligation of citizens and building the concept of respecting the law, respecting and protecting public properties, respecting the rules of social public life, and respecting and protecting social justice.

We oppose negative manifestations, unethical behavior, way of living based on selfishness and doing harm to others, and enemy acts of destruction against culture and ideology.

Criticizing ill manners and bad habits must go hand in hand with praising good people and good deeds. Criticisms must carry the weight of criticisms—to make social opinion point out faults, detest the bad, and become infuriated by bad things. Praises must carry the weight of praises. We must make all members of society turn their thoughts to the truth, the good, and the beautiful to the extent that they aspire after a life full of cultural values and noble morality. Criticizing the bad and praising the good must bring about the results of making the people have more confidence in the party's leadership, have confidence in the state, have confidence in the road leading to socialism, and have confidence in "light certainly will chase away darkness," as General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh has often reminded us about.

I would like to convey my greetings to all of you working for DAI DOAN KET.

#### Discussion on Eliminating Formalism, Making FF Work Effective

42090231 Hanoi DAI DOAN KET in Vietnamese  
18-24 Mar 89 p 2

[Article by Tong Duy Vuong, chairman, Thai Binh Provincial Fatherland Front Committee: "Moving Toward Eliminating Formalism in Fatherland Front Work"]

[Text] One time I went to Dong My Village in Dong Hung District and found that two conferences were held there the same day. One was a Women's Association meeting that dealt with the topic, "Bringing up good children." The audience was very large, more than 300 women. Some women who had been cutting vegetables in the field stopped their work and went to the meeting, where they listened in an orderly manner. Nearby was a

Youth Union political class teaching revolutionary ideals and scientific communism. Although 150 people had been invited, only a few dozens showed up. The audience in the afternoon session was even smaller and less orderly because almost nobody listened to the lectures.

That fact indicated that any activity that was formalistic and only a showoff and failed to deal with the hot topics raised by the everyday life would not attract the people. Any activity that was dealing with life's urgent matters would attract lots of people. That was also a lesson for the work of the Fatherland Front (FF).

The fact that the FF is like an ornamental plant and has a formalistic nature originates from its overall shortcoming, namely, it has not yet fully developed the role of being the representative of the people's real ownership right. The FF has not concerned itself with the hot topics in life having to do with democratic rights. It has no voice, or if it has a voice, its voice has no strength. Therefore, the people have not come to the FF, nor have they felt attached to it.

For the time being, our FF is mainly doing mobilizing work (to buy state bonds, to support Armenia, and so on), work related to the elderly people, and greetings. And thus it will be an organization of only older people and will be incapable of playing the role of the broadest mass organization and the bridge between the party and the masses. But even in regard to its mobilizing work, if it is unable to promote the people's ownership right, how can it continue to mobilize people? For some time now, whenever the FF comes to the people, it mostly tries to urge the people to make contributions. How can it generate solidarity and unanimity when it appeals for solidarity without fighting oppression and injustice?

Recently our FF in Thai Binh Province took part in resolving a number of the people's complaints, but the recommendations it submitted to the organs concerned have hardly been heeded at all. Therefore, there must be regulations on work relationships for the FF to work with state organs. This will be the direction for long-term and basic resolving of the matter. Without such regulations, no matter how much appeal it may make and how much change it generates for itself, the FF will still remain an ornamental plant. Recently the Thai Binh Provincial People's Committee suggested to the FF that it launch a speak-your-mind phase and draft a regulation to determine the relationships between itself and the People's Committee. But we could not do this because the FF at the central level has not succeeded in having a regulation adopted. I think that the central-level FF has been too slow in providing leadership over the FF work and has not worked closely with its local chapters. It has not acted to deal with the most basic matters in its work, nor has it maintained tight leadership, while the localities have been free to do whatever they would like to; it also has failed to draw experience from any single chapter that did good FF work, nor has it found a typical model to set as an example.

We have learned that in Kien Giang Province, the FF successfully participated in resolving the people's letters and complaints. The deputy secretary of the Provincial CPV Committee is also chairman of the province's chapter. As a result, the people have been coming to the FF in very large numbers. The FF at the central level has not yet completed a final review of this model. Is the fact that the Kien Giang FF chapter's voice has weight due to its chairman being a deputy secretary at the same time? Or is it due to other aspects? All these questions have not yet been reviewed. After the 12th Thai Binh Provincial FF Congress had been held, almost all FF cadres in the province went through some changes. Only one district, Hung Ha, has an FF cadre being the head of its FF chapter, but all other districts have now put the secretaries or deputy secretaries of the CPV chapters at the head of their FF chapters. This situation has the only advantage of the heads of FF chapters being also called party committee echelons, but this position is far from a profound one, for being the FF head is only the added title of an acting job. In my opinion, as an immediate need, we must put FF cadres in charge, who should also be party committee members, if we want to allow FF chapters to operate easily, to represent in an effective manner the people's voice, and to coordinate and unify FF activities. But even at the central level, the current leaders are not part of the party committee echelons, and if they are not among the latter, what work relationships we should give them is something we at the basic level are still waiting for, rather in vain so far.

The mentality of FF cadres being complacent and satisfied with their own work while refusing to change themselves has also made the FF less effective. On the part of our locality, we are changing ourselves and expanding the all-people great solidarity bloc: To admit into our FF chapter private economic delegates and families having relatives living overseas, to turn FF work teams into FF work committees, and to shoulder more arbitrating work in population matters.

Moving with the country's renovating trend, the FF chapters at all levels are gradually renovating themselves in order to assert their role and position.

Through DAI DOAN KET, we propose that FF chapters in all provinces exchange with one another their experience in how to eliminate formalism in the FF work, to deal with problems, and to recommend ways to resolve them.

**Reorganization of State Mechanism Discussed**  
42090205a Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese  
15 Mar 89 p 3

[“Party Building” column by Minh Son: “What Can Be Seen From the Reorganization of the State Agencies?”]

[Text] For a long time now, our state management apparatus at all echelons has been very large but not strong, and management results in general have been

poor. There have been many overlapping organizations, and the system of corporations has become quite “bloated.” Not only has this not stimulated production and business, but it has also created obstacles for the process of making innovations. The forces not engaged in the production of materials are posing a greater and greater burden on an already weak economy.

Starting from the real situation mentioned above, after the Sixth Party Congress, the resolutions and directives that followed all regarded reorganizing the apparatus of the various-echelon state agencies as an important and urgent task that is closely tied to the process of making innovations.

**What results have been achieved during the past 2 years, particularly in 1988?**

The ministries, commissions, general departments, and other organizations subordinate to the Council of Ministers have carried on a reorganization based on determining the state management functions of the ministries, sectors, and central echelon and the production and business functions of the primary level economic organizations. Notable adjustments have been made in the apparatus to help the organizations of the ministries and general departments, such as the departments and sections. Many organizations have divided the units into three types of units—production and business units, professional units, and administrative units (departments)—in order to reorganize the apparatus and the ranks of cadres, redefine the relationships, and eliminate overlapping jobs. Almost all of the central organizations have submitted a reorganization plan to the Council of Ministers and almost all of the plans have been approved. According to data at 31 organizations, the number of departments and other units has been reduced 40 percent (from 380 departments to only 227, with 153 centers eliminated). A number of organizations such as the Ministry of Engineering and Metals and the Ministry of Energy have reorganized the apparatus quickly. A few organizations have organized work methods based on a system of specialists. By the end of 1988, the localities had virtually completed reorganizing the apparatus. They are now managing things using the new apparatus. At the provincial level, in the past there was an average of 34 bureaus, committees, and commissions, but now there are only 25 units. At the district level, the number of offices and committees has been reduced from 25 to only 15. At the primary level, the number of offices has been cut in half as compared with before. The localities that have reorganized the apparatus relatively quickly include Hoang Lien Son, Ha Tuyen, Hau Giang, Kien Giang, Gia Lai-Kon Tum, Nghia Binh, and Phu Khanh. The size of the administrative staffs in the state management organizations, with the exception of the operations staffs, has been greatly reduced. But what needs to be noted is that there is now a consensus among almost all the leading cadres and in the sectors and echelons concerning the need to reduce the number and increase the quality of the cadres and make the apparatus simpler

and more effective. The state management staffs at the central organizations were reduced by 10 percent by the middle of 1988. The localities made reductions of more than 10 percent, and some places reduced the size of the staffs by about 20 percent.

As for the surplus people, a number of central sectors and localities have actively redeployed them based on the general policies of the state and made rational use of them based on their capabilities. As a result, stagnation has been virtually eliminated in the Ministry of Engineering and Metals and in Lang Son and Thai Binh provinces. In rearranging the cadres through consolidating the organizations, attention has been focused on finding the right people for the right job and paying special attention to quality and labor results.

Along with consolidating the state management organizations, a number of central sectors and localities have systematically reorganized the operating, production and business, and scientific research organizations and units. Some places have established titles and standards for civil servants in order to perfect the apparatus and deploy the cadres. On the other hand, the central sectors and localities have created conditions to help 100 mass social and vocational organizations in order to make their activities more effective.

Building and solidifying the administration at the various echelons, particularly village and subward administration, has been carried on urgently. Many localities such as Ha Nam Ninh, Nghe Tinh, Ha Tuyen, Quang Nam-Danang, Nghia Binh, Haiphong, and Tien Giang have used many forms and specific plans to launch a movement to strengthen the primary level administration. Attention has also been given to gaining experience. The average and good primary bases have been increased in terms of both number and quality. Relations between the authorities and the masses have improved.

Although initial results have been achieved in reorganizing the apparatus of the state organizations, the work of building and solidifying the administration has exposed many aspects that are not in accord with task of making innovations:

First, reducing the staffs in the state organizations has not been carried on as originally planned. In the central organizations, the size of the staffs was reduced only 10 percent in 1988 even though the plan called for a reduction of 28 percent as compared with 1987. The localities planned a reduction of 25 percent, but the actual reduction in size was only 10 percent. A number of central committees, sectors, departments, and institutes and a number of bureaus, offices, and committees in the localities have formulated plans to consolidate or split apart units, but things have been done very slowly.

Second, the deployment of the cadres has not been prepared well. This work has been carried out passively. In many cases, the new organizations that have been

formed have not deployed leaders or the leaders have not been able to manage things. Thus, even though the organizations are said to be suitable, they have not been able to manifest an effect.

Third, coordination between the central sectors and the localities with respect to the system of sector organizations at the provincial and district levels is not good. In many cases, there are conflicts, which has created difficulties for the primary level units.

Fourth, the work of reducing the size of the staffs and resolving the problem of surplus people following the consolidation of the organizations at the central echelon and in the localities has been carried on too slowly. Most of these people are "in limbo." They have not been let go and so they pose a great burden on the state budget.

Fifth, the primary-level administration, particularly in the subwards and villages, has been reorganized, but it is still a weak element. In general, the primary-level authorities do not have a spirit of responsibility toward the people at the bases and at higher echelons. They have manifested right-wing deviations and bureaucratic tendencies, committed disciplinary violations, remained aloof from the people, and failed to grasp the wishes of the people. In some places, they have oppressed the masses and ignored the democratic rights of the people. Acts of corruption and activities aimed at helping certain individuals and the families of a number of cadres, which have harmed the interests of the people and state, have occurred in many localities.

What are the reasons for the above shortcomings? We feel that the following are some of the main reasons:

First, the system of bureaucratism and state subsidies has existed for many years. Many cadres in the sectors and at various echelons have created many organizations and positions and put people, particularly relatives from the rural areas, on the state roll. The state has provided budget funds and aid. Second, because of the long war, many laws and regulations have been ignored. Third, among the state's policies, there is no policy on giving preferential treatment to those who scored achievements for the revolution. Our present system of retirement benefits is characterized by average-ism. Retired people, particularly military cadres, are encountering many difficulties.

Although the reorganization of the state apparatus and the construction and consolidation of the various-echelon administrative organizations is still plagued by various problems and difficulties, the past period has shown that unless the apparatus is simplified, it will not be possible to reduce the size of the staffs. In the past, we have reduced the size of the staffs but have not simplified the organization. And so in just a very short time, the staffs again grew in size and the apparatus expanded. Experiences in a number of localities and sectors have shown that to reduce the size of the staffs, there must be

suitable policies, and these must be implemented in harmony with the conditions in each place in order to solve specific problems in accord with the specific situation.

### Decline of Youth Union Discussed

42090205b Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese  
17 Mar 89 p 2

[Article by Nguyen Trieu: "A Few Thoughts on the Role and Effect of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union"]

[Text] The Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union now has more than 3 million members. It scored many glorious achievements during the recent resistance for national salvation. The guns have been quiet for about 10 years now and so why has role of the union decreased? In Hanoi, the Municipal Communist Youth Union controls only about 30 percent of the youths. For the past few years, if a student wants to go on to college, he has had to be a member of the youth union. But today, fewer than 35 percent of the youth union members are really involved in the union. In rural Hanoi, when they are demobilized, soldiers who are members of the youth union abandon union activities and no longer consider themselves to be members. This situation is now widespread and is becoming even more widespread. After starting a family, female members stop participating in youth union activities. Many youth union members refuse to reveal that they are members and do not take pride in being a member of the youth union.

Youth union organizations hold many meetings and conferences, but little is achieved. Most youth union members are aware of negative phenomena where they work and live, but few have tried to do anything about these things because they do not think that it is possible to achieve anything. Furthermore, those who have taken the lead in waging a struggle have often had to admit defeat, even in cases in which they have received support from the youth union or Youth Union Central Committee.

Pham Thu Hang (Dong Da General School), the head of an excellent national unit and a delegate to the Fifth Youth Union Congress, was elected to the Youth Union Central Committee. But for a long time, she was not considered for membership in the party.

In general, each year, fewer than 30 percent of the outstanding youth union members are recommended for membership in the party. One reason for this is that the union organizations do not select people carefully, and recommendations are not made seriously. But another reason concerns the responsibility of the party committee echelons toward the youth union.

We often talk about the attention that the party committee echelons and authorities give to youth union activities. But the truth is, the party committee echelons and authorities have not adequately fulfilled even their own

responsibilities. The union is quiet. Many youth union bases do little to protect their legitimate rights.

If the youth union went out of existence, would this affect society in any way? One provincial youth union secretary responded to this question by saying that "it would definitely have an effect. For example, if there were no youth union, who would work on the water conservancy projects during November and December?" The secretary of an industrial production installation said that "at the end of the year, without the union, who would implement the plans?"

What that means is that the union has a certain role and effect. But actually, that is not an effect but an erroneous concept concerning the effect and assault role of the union. The result, as everyone knows, is that youths don't know what to do or just "obey orders." In many places, the union is like a tool used to "put out a fire." Once the fire is out, it is forgotten.

The youth union is an organization that has great potential. Unfortunately, this potential has not been exploited or used properly. It has been wasted.

One of the youth union's key tasks this year is to promote and expand the movement to improve the quality of youth union members and build strong union chapters. But this movement has led to much discussion, because it has not determined the form of the union chapters in accord with the requirements and the demands of the youth union members. Last year and this year, the union is shifting toward carrying on economic tasks at its economic bases, which includes sewing, carpentry, and travel, and in assault youth formations which the youth union participates in managing. That is a timely tendency. But little attention has been given to opposing negative phenomena and those who make use of their positions to enrich themselves. The rights of the union members must be protected based on clearly defining the relationship between the party and the youth union and between the administration and the union. Many good examples have been mentioned based on these tendencies, but they have not been exploited, and there are no forms for manifesting the role and effect of these units.

### MILITARY

#### General Calls for Renovation of Political Education

42090254 Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Apr 89 pp 12-16

[Article by Colonel General Dang Vu Hiep: "Renovate and Improve the Quality of Political Education in the Army"]

### I

[Text] Political education is an extremely important part of the party's ideological work in the army. It is responsible for equipping cadres and enlisted men with basic

matters and new knowledge that affect their political and ideological orientation and consolidate their working class stands and viewpoints in examining and resolving problems that arise in the actual process of developing the revolution and building and defending the socialist homeland, as well as correctly understanding the nature of the major problems of international life. It creates a basis on which to form and improve political skills and revolutionary quality and morality, and enables every cadre and enlisted man to react with initiative and correctly, in accordance with the viewpoints of the party, in the various circumstances they encounter. Therefore, our party always has adhered, and always will adhere, to the viewpoint of "making political construction the basis on which to improve the all-round quality of the people's armed forces," closely leads the political-ideological work in the army, and guards against and struggles to overcome the viewpoints of "military only or technology only" or of regarding lightly the factors of politics and political activity in the activity and life of the armed forces.

Although during the past 7 years the army, implementing the policy of the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee, has made all-out efforts to reform political education in the units and schools, and has attained initial positive results, it must be frankly admitted that the quality and effectiveness of education are still low and there has been a considerable gap between the results that have been attained and the requirements of the situation and missions. The political education work has not yet provided sufficient theoretical and practical bases on which to increase combativeness and persuasiveness, to stop and overcome negative phenomena, and to resolve questions of cadres and enlisted men which arise in complicated situations. Furthermore, our people's socialist revolution has begun the process of renovation in many regards, in accordance with the spirit and viewpoints of the Sixth Party Congress. The more deeply renovation penetrates, the more new problems arise relevant to socialist awareness and concepts and the path of building socialism and defending the socialist homeland in our country. If there is to be a high degree of unanimity in awareness, thought, and action vis-a-vis the new stands and policies of the party, the party members, cadres, and enlisted men must have new theoretical knowledge of the socialist revolution and socialist construction, of the nature of the era, of the special characteristics of the world today, of the mission of defending the homeland, and of the military work and national defense against the new international background. At the same time, there must be scientific thought methods based on firmly grasping the true nature of Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism. Only thereby can we bolster and elevate belief and create a basis for fully bringing into play the political-morale factor in all activities of the armed forces. The entire situation described above demands that political education in the army be renovated and its quality improved.

Our direction of renovation is, on the basis of adhering to the political work direction of the Sixth Party Congress, developed and concretized by the Party Central

Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Military Commission of the Party Central Committee, and on the basis of the conclusions drawn from the preliminary recapitulation of theoretical-political education in the units and schools of the army during the past several years, amend and supplement the education curriculum, concretize the contents so that they can be appropriate to the different categories, and renovate the organization, methods, and forms of education so that they can be appropriate to the categories and circumstances.

The renovation of political education is an urgent, and at the same time, permanent and long-range task. During the next 3 years (1989-1991), on the basis of the results of recapitulating the actual situation and theoretical research of the party we will supplement and renovate, step by step, the educational curricula and contents, while also carrying out research and preparing other conditions so that after the Seventh Party Congress we can rapidly and fundamentally renovate them and continue to perfect them. In the process of renovation, we must always grasp the matters and principles guiding politics and ideology:

1. Building a socialist Vietnam is the goal and ideal of our party and people. The path chosen by our party and Uncle Ho was a completely correct path.
2. Marxism-Leninism is always the ideological foundation and compass for the activities of our party. The renovation of thought is intended to overcome inappropriate viewpoints regarding socialism and develop the principles of Marxism-Leninism, not to abandon them.
3. We must always be vigilant toward the enemy's long-range plot of weakening and subduing our country; smash all of their schemes to sabotage and violate the sovereignty, territory, and security of our homeland; and keep the peace, develop the economy, and build a rich and strong nation. When the enemy begins a war of aggression we must resolutely wage a victorious war to defend the homeland.
4. We must build a strong national defense of all the people, build people's armed forces consisting of a people's army (regular forces and mobilized reserve forces) and powerful militia and self-defense forces which have increasingly higher over-all quality, build increasingly strong provincial (or municipal) defensive zones, and wage people's war to defend the homeland when the enemy invade.
5. We must combine patriotism with proletarian internationalism and socialist internationalism. We must be on guard against the phenomena of vagueness and distorted tendencies in one direction or another with regard to those matters of principle, which harm the building up of the army.

Thus it is necessary to resolutely renovate political education in the army, in accordance with predetermined goals and schedules, and it is essential that the renovation process be closely led.

## II

In order to renovate, and improve the quality of, political education, it is necessary to resolve all problems: curricula and contents, methods, forms, the people doing education work, and the material-technical bases.

Determining the goals and requirements for the political education of cadres and enlisted men in the army is the first task that must be accomplished in the renovation process. The goals and requirements are the targets that must be attained and determine all educational activities. In order to have accurate and sufficient goals, they must be based on the revolutionary line and missions and on the military line and missions, and on the working class nature of our army and the principles of building people's armed forces. At the same time, attention must be paid to the special characteristics of the educational categories. There must be goals for the political education of each echelon and each type of cadre in the schools, for each cadre echelon in the units, and for noncommissioned officers and enlisted men. Those goals will be concretized into specific requirements regarding knowledge, political quality, revolutionary morality, etc.

1. On the basis of the goals and requirements of political education, it is necessary to review comprehensively the educational system, curricula, and contents.

In the schools, the theory and political education curricula and contents must be basic, systematic, and practical. The structure of the curricula must ensure balance between theory and practice and basic Marxist-Leninist theory must be closely bound to the lines and policies of the party in the initial phase of the period of transition to socialism in our country. The contents and curricula must manifest a clear division among the various levels of study. With regard to basic-level cadres it is necessary to expand their knowledge basically, systematically, and comprehensively. With regard to mid-level and high-level cadres it is necessary to illuminate the theoretical and practical bases of the truths, categories, and laws, illuminate the revolutionary and scientific nature of our party, and enter deeply into resolving the actual problems of society and the army. The duplication of contents must be completely overcome. We must resolutely eliminate the contents and topics that are not truly necessary or are outmoded, include practical topics and contents and the new conclusions of our party, and ensure that the curricula gradually advance to the optimal level.

In the units, it is necessary to include in the annual on-the-job educational curricula of cadres, in addition to the resolutions of the Party Central Committee and the

Political Bureau, the most essential contents in order to strengthen scientific methodology and equip them with new knowledge of socialism, and ensure practicality and usefulness in actual activity. As regards the educational curricula for noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, they must be supplemented with contents to make them appropriate to the new requirements and missions, and some lessons must be amended so that they can be appropriate to the level of knowledge and psychological characteristics of those categories. Twenty percent of the total annual political education time of the military regions, armed forces branches, corps, combat arms, etc., must be set aside for teaching necessary subjects that are appropriate to the units' political missions.

2. The methods of teaching and studying social science subjects in the schools must be renovated strongly, in accordance with the following guiding thoughts:

a. The instructors should not do the work for the students. The students should not study passively and only takes or memorize texts so that they can answer questions. Instruction should not amount only to presenting conclusions that have already been reached, but should appeal to and stimulate the thought of the students and encourage them to think, seek the truth, analyze, and solve actual problems, including those regarding conduct in life, in order to being about self-transformation and self-development with regard to personality.

b. Traditional methods must be closely combined with advanced, modern methods, and the cumbersome "monologue" method must be gradually changed to the direct "dialogue" method. The forms of exchanges and discussions, with meticulous preparation, must be strengthened. True debates between the instructors and the students, and among the students, about theoretical and practical matters, to find the most correct solutions, must be promoted.

c. The form of self-study must be stressed and the students must be encouraged to be inquisitive and creative. The ratio of self-study by students in comparison to class time must be increased.

The reviewing, organizing, examining, and inspecting methods must be improved. The viewpoints toward evaluating the results of study and the emulation must be truly renovated, in order to correctly evaluate the results of the education and training process and eliminate negative phenomena that harm the creation of the new man.

In the units, it is necessary to carefully study the objects of education in order to determine the optimal educational forms and methods and create interest in the lessons. With regard to noncommissioned officers and enlisted men, we must combine the form of conveying information with questions and answers, expand the

form of direct dialogues between the upper-echelon cadres and the lower-echelon cadres and enlisted men, and improve the form of political reporting so that it may be livelier.

3. The instructor is the central figure in the education process and the quality of instructors determines the quality of education.

At present, in general the corps of instructors in the schools and the cadres in basic-level units do not meet the present requirements and will find it even more difficult to meet the requirements of renovation.

It is necessary to draft short-term and long-term plans for training instructors for the schools. The Political-Military Institute will expand its concentrated classes to train instructors with college and post-graduate educations, while also holding short-term training classes and practice classes to raise the levels of instructors who are now working and teaching at the schools, with emphasis on training leading cadres (faculty heads) at the elementary-level schools.

In the units, it is necessary to positively train the political cadres at the basic level so that they can be capable of fulfilling well the task of educating noncommissioned officers and enlisted men. Short-term training classes must be organized before each training phase, there must be monthly training sessions, inspections, practice teaching, instructor evaluations to gain experience, etc., in order to raise their levels. Those tasks are the responsibility of the division echelon.

4. Expenditures and material-technical bases are factors guaranteeing the quality of education. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure the essential expenditures and have plans for gradually strengthening the material-technical bases of that task. One cannot have the simplistic concept that in political study it is only necessary to sit and listen, and that the only things needed are additional blackboards and some pieces of chalk.

Budgets, materials, and equipment for instruction and study must be managed, distributed, and used with a spirit of economizing and practicality, which is appropriate to the capabilities of the economy and ensures high effectiveness.

There must be a plan to provide the necessary facilities and technical means for the specialized assembly halls and laboratories, while also encouraging the schools to manifest a spirit of self-reliance, dynamism, and creativity on the part of instructors and students, and strengthen those bases in order to apply advanced methods and improve the quality of instruction and study.

Renovating political theory education is an important aspect of renovating the party's ideological work. Its foremost tasks are to bring about renovation of thought and thought methods, cultivate revolutionary qualities

and morality, and build social consciousness and socialist personality. Therefore, strengthening the leadership and close guidance of the party committee echelons, the command cadres, and the political organs at all levels is an objective requirement and a basic factor in ensuring victory for the great undertaking of renovation in all segments and aspects of the educational process.

It is necessary to fully understand educational theories and the general educational viewpoints of the party, and closely guide the implementation of those principles in all aspects and segments of the renovation process. The outmoded, simplistic concepts about that matter on the part of some cadres, including leadership cadres and unit commanders, must be completely overcome.

The stipulations regarding the decentralization of education management, from planning and all-round preparations to organizing implementation, carrying out inspections, evaluating results, managing people, and improving quality in all regards, must be implemented well. The phenomena of arbitrariness, cutting back on time, contents, and curricula, not guaranteeing the instructional standards and the required number of students, etc., must be overcome. All of those tasks ensure unity throughout the army, while also bringing into play the initiative and creativity of the units in their sphere of authority, with the goal of continually improving the quality and effectiveness of education.

#### Official Stresses Importance of Peacetime Readiness

42090252 Hanoi TAP CHI QUOC PHONG TOAN DAN in Vietnamese Mar 89 pp 32-34

[Article by Colonel Do Nguyen Trinh: "Peacetime Army Organization and Wartime Requirements"]

[Text] In the resolution of the Sixth Party Congress, in addition to the famous experience lesson of "making the people the root," the lesson of "acting in accordance with laws" is no less important. Thus how do laws affect the task of strengthening national defense and defending the homeland? Is not the law of the strong winning and the weak losing one of the basic laws? After 8 years of fighting the French, concluding with the 1953-1954 winter-spring fighting, the high point of which was the Dien Bien Phu campaign, and after more than 20 years of fighting the Americans, concluding with the General Offensive and Uprising of the spring of 1975, the high point of which was the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, we were stronger than the enemy we forced to admit defeat. But in a future war to defend the homeland, our people and nation cannot accept long periods of time of 8 years, 20 years, etc., for in such periods of time the enemy may completely erase the accomplishments achieved by our people during years of peaceful labor.

Thus, if we act in accordance with the laws of war, when the enemy invades our country we must have immediately available a force stronger than the invading army if

we are to be strong enough to expel it from our country. Preparing the nation, building up the armed forces, and maintaining combat readiness to cope with the enemy are essential tasks that are in accordance with the laws. But if we simply and one-sidedly build strong forces by means of a large standing army we will violate another law and will cancel the foremost mission of building socialism, for no economy, no matter strong, could withstand building up and maintaining such a large and powerful army in peacetime. That is even more significant with regard to countries with limited economic potential, such as ours. Furthermore, war to defend our homeland is people's war, and in peacetime it must be a matter of preparation and readiness on the part of the entire population, not just the army.

Therefore, how must we act in accordance with the laws and how do other countries of the world resolve that problem? The common tendency is to maintain only an elite, streamlined standing army accompanied by truly powerful reserve forces within the people. The regular forces must be sufficiently strong to, along with the other forces, maintain political security and social order and safety, and when our country is invaded they must be sufficiently strong to stop the enemy at the border and prevent them from devastating the border areas at will. As for the task of surrounding and annihilating the enemy and throwing them back across the border, that is the responsibility of the strategic reserve troops, who are mobilized when the nation is imperiled (here we refer only to the land; we must also be capable of fighting in the air and at sea). In many countries the streamlined regular army is usually maintained at a ratio of 0.5 to 0.8 percent, or a maximum of 1 percent, of the nation's population. That ratio usually consumes about five percent of the national income. That is an expenditure which the economy can bear. What is the right number of reserve troops? According to calculations, the reserve troops must be many times more numerous than the regular troops. During World War I, Russia had a standing army of 1.3 million and 5.6 million reserve troops; France had a standing army of 0.8 million and 4.9 million reserve troops; and Austria-Hungary had a standing army of 0.4 million and 3 million reserve troops. During World War II, at the beginning of 1939 the armed forces of the Soviet Union totalled 1.9 million; in mid-1940 they totalled 3.6 million; at the beginning of 1941 they totalled 4.2 million; and by 1 June 1941 they had increased to nearly 5 million. At the beginning the armed forces of the United States totalled 1.6 million, by the end of 1942 they totalled 5.4 million, and by August 1943 they had increased to 8.3 million. Without powerful reserve forces, how could those nations have expanded their armies so rapidly?

Our reserve troops are workers, peasants, and intellectuals who ordinarily are engaged in economic and cultural development, but when the nation is invaded they take up arms to defend the homeland. They are registered and formed into reserve units. Every year those units carry out mobilization drills and combat training. Ordinarily,

every year they receive concentrated military training for a certain period of time, in accordance with a long-range program, to ensure that after a few years they can fight on about the same level as the regular troops. Clearly, the expense of a reserve army is very small in comparison to the expense of a standing army. The main problem is to enable the reserve troops to have a high degree of combat readiness and skills and capabilities to fight well and in a timely manner, so that the reserve troops can be mobilized rapidly and participate in combat immediately.

In many nations in the world the Class-1 reserve troops consist of youths who have fulfilled their military obligations and returned to the localities. Furthermore, they organize regular units which have practically their full complements of officers and noncommissioned officers and a small number of enlisted men, most of whom are technical personnel. In wartime, it is essentially only necessary to add reserve troops. Here are some examples: prior to World War II, the divisions in Germany's TO&E consisted of 100 percent of the officers, 70 percent of the noncommissioned officers, and 50 percent of the enlisted men; the French units consisted of 76 percent of the officers, 54.5 percent of the noncommissioned officers, and 43.6 percent of the enlisted men; and the Russian units consisted of 85 percent of the officers, 42 percent of the noncommissioned officers, and 48 percent of the enlisted men.

But the number of troops is not everything. Millions of recently mobilized troops must be equipped and supported in all respects. So that within a few days the newly formed units can be fully equipped, the various nations must mobilize the things needed by the army, such as vehicles, machinery, ships, etc., from the economic sectors. Of course, preparations must be made in advance, in accordance with a plan that has been drafted based on the principle of on-the-spot supplementation, for only then can we make good use of time.

With regards to weapons and equipment, preparations must be made earlier, usually several months earlier, and sometimes a year before war breaks out (according to strategic estimates). During that tense period of time, thought must be given to increasing the production of weapons and military equipment at the necessary levels. We must be prepared and ready to mobilize factories with appropriate capacities and technology to change them over to producing goods to meet the requirements of expanding the army. Those are necessary steps in transforming the nation's economy from a peacetime status to a wartime status.

During World War II, beginning in September 1939, i.e., nearly 2 years before the war to defend the homeland broke out, the Soviet Union decided to build and bring into production 16 factories to produce airplanes and airplane engines. In 1940, it brought into production seven additional factories to produce new-type aircraft engines but still could not keep up with the great scale of development of the armed forces. Therefore, on the

second day of the war (23 June 1941) it had to change its ammunition production plan and on 30 June 1941 (8 days after the outbreak of the war) it had to replace its peacetime economic plan with a new economic plan with the goal of rapidly increasing by 26 percent, in comparison to the old plan, the production of combat facilities and equipment and the army's other needs.

Carrying out the policy of having an elite, streamlined standing army and a powerful reserve force in peacetime, in order to, in wartime, have military forces that are many times more powerful, is a great task of strategic significance. We must carry it out step-by-step and solidly, and emphasize quality. That is not the work of the military organs alone, but is the responsibility of the entire party, the entire population, and all mass organizations, and is also the responsibility of all echelons of the government and all sectors of the national economy. There must be a clear division of responsibility in order to prepare and carry out all tasks, including mobilization, to create conditions for the cadres, workers, and civil servants to join reserve units, and preparations to mobilize the capacities, and change the technical processes, of the factories and enterprises, so that they can change over to producing to meet the wartime needs of the army.

Acting in accordance with laws will lead to success, but achieving it will not be easy. Considerable difficulties have been encountered in building a conventional, modern army in peacetime. Building a streamlined army in peacetime so that when war breaks out it can grow many-fold, in the manner of the "God of Wind," is also an extremely difficult and complicated task. There must be resolute leadership, farsightedness and broadsightedness, good organizational skill, tight plans, and responsible cooperation among the sectors and echelons on the basis of fully understanding the two strategic missions: developing the nation and defending the socialist homeland.

**Activities of Truong Son Corps**  
**42090203b Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in**  
**Vietnamese 10 Mar 89 p 3**

[Article by Le Hoe: "In Its 4th Year, the Truong Son Corps Has Achieved a Balance in Accord With the New Mechanism"]

[Text] The Truong Son Corps [binh doan] is an economic corps that specializes in building roads and bridges. In 1988, the corps actively struggled to overcome the objective and subjective difficulties in order to escape the bureaucratic and state subsidies system to which it had been shackled for so long and promptly shifted to the new economic management system based on Decision 217 of the Council of Ministers. Overcoming the obstacles, such as a lack of investment capital, a limited budget, a lack of balance with respect to a number of aspects, inflation, and a reduced labor force, the production plans were expanded and implemented in

accord with socialist business accounting formulas. The value of gross production reached 17.6 billion dong, or 121 percent of the plan. The value of commodities completed, tested, and sold was 16.5 billion dong, or 118 percent of the plan. Profits reached 2.2 billion dong, 153 percent of the plan. After balancing expenditures, the corps paid 847 million dong to the state budget. After deducting the operating and national defense expenses, which totaled 614 million dong, a total of 233 million dong was contributed to the budget. Thus, since 1985, this is the 4th year that the corps has "balanced things itself" and contributed more capital to the state than in the prior year. The lives of the laborers have been stabilized, and in a number of places, such as units 35, 565, 185, and 384, income levels are good. The corps has developed a product quality control system and purchased a number of test implements. It has strengthened inspections at all the units and so the quality of the projects has gradually been improved.

In order to ensure economic results in organizing and using the laborers, the corps eliminated a number of centers. At the corps level, the agencies reduced the number of cadres and employees 18 percent as compared with the previous year. The size of the detachments directly subordinate was reduced 28 percent. At the production units, the size of the management organizations was reduced 16 percent, and the support detachments were reduced by 11 percent. The percentage of troops in the economic sphere increased from 83.7 percent in 1987 to 90 percent in 1988. This was the first year that the corps recruited contract laborers, employing 292 people. Group 470 recruited 173 people, of whom 27 were technical specialists. In order to meet the technical and professional labor requirements, the corps organized training classes for 154 students in the machine operation, roads and bridges, and reporting sectors and organized supplementary education classes, which resulted in promotions for 598 people.

Changing directions with respect to technical materials, the corps actively contracted to pick up, transport, and promptly distribute the materials to the construction units in accord with the plan. It picked up 48 machines in accord with the norms and obtained 36 vehicles and machines and a number of engines, storage batteries, and tires in excess of the norms. It expanded supplying items to the localities and provided services in order to create supplemental sources of technical materials. The use system for vehicles and machinery increased 1.15 and 4.5 percent respectively as compared with 1987. It improved the quality of operations of the stations and workshops and repaired 80 vehicles and 44 graders of various types. The technical factors for vehicles and machinery were 3 and 5 percent higher respectively as compared with 1987. Vehicle races were organized at units 17 and 532.

This was the 1st year that financial independence was practiced in accord with the spirit of Decision 217 of the Council of Ministers. Many positive measures were

implemented in carrying on financial activities. At a time when the state could provide only one-third of the capital needed, the corps mobilized capital from various sources and provided more than 90 percent of the capital needed for the entire year, which increased the total amount of budget and corps liquid assets provided to the units from 1,173 million dong at the beginning of the year to 2,067 million dong at the end of the year. The corps made short-term loans at a rate of interest equal to 50 percent of the rate set by the state bank. It also made interest-free loans to subsidiary producers, and created additional sources of income from integrated business activities. The corps organized tests to complete the products on time, recover the capital more quickly than in 1987, and maintain a monthly cash flow of 1.4 billion dong (equal to 4.4 times), or a liquid asset flow of 4.6 times.

In all the jobs, a great effort was made to make innovations in the operation of the machinery. However, the corps still recognized that because of the profits made during previous years within the state subsidies price system, the profits of socialist business production were not yet very significant. Among the units that made a profit in production and business, there were also items of in consequence. At the operations centers, fewer than half the units were regarded as having management capabilities. The results achieved did not match the requirements concerning making innovations or the existing capabilities. Management followed the administrative, bureaucratic, and state subsidies model. In coming years, the production and business operations of the corps can follow an economic model: a general corporation, corporations and enterprises. There will be a labor structure in which the men no longer have a military obligation. Instead, there will be short-, medium-, and long-term contract personnel and laborers. There will not be national defense expenses, and the operating expenses will be reduced to a minimum. The economic and national defense systems cannot be determined by the system or standards of the economic forces of one sector. Each unit must generate capital for investment, carry on accounting, and balance things in all respects. Capital will not be provided from the budget. Loans must be repaid with interest to the banks. A unit will no longer be compensated for its losses. If the productivity of a unit is low, it must change directions. The entire corps must use productivity, quality, and good results in economic activities to justify its existence and expansion.

#### **Demobilized Soldiers Face Problems, Lack Jobs**

42090203 Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in  
Vietnamese 7 Mar 89 pp 1, 4

[Article by Phuc Nguyen: "From a Conference on Jobs for Demobilized Soldiers in Ho Chi Minh City: 'With No Occupational Qualifications and Low Cultural Standards, Demobilized Soldiers Have a Difficult Time Finding a Job'"]

[Text] Before the 1989 draft of youths, the Labor, War Invalids, and Social Welfare Service and the Ho Chi

Minh City Communist Youth Union decided to hold a conference on a very urgent problem, finding jobs for demobilized soldiers. Today, the problem of finding jobs is a very important aspect of the military's rear area policy. This is organically related to the annual military recruitment campaign. Many youths who are preparing to join the army are concerned about whether they will be able to find a job when they return. Youths who already have jobs wonder whether their jobs will be waiting for them after they complete their military service. Those are legitimate concerns. The echelons, sectors, and localities are all responsible for allaying the fears of demobilized soldiers, soldiers on active duty, and youths who are about to enter the military.

Those at the conference mentioned a number of problems that must be given attention:

Many demobilized soldiers have trouble finding a job because of their low level of education. Few of these people have professional qualifications. After they return from the military, it is difficult to persuade them to take supplemental education or vocational courses, because most of them come from poor families and do not have enough money to go to school.

Soldiers have a harder time finding a job than assault youths, because few of the soldiers have a trade. The assault youths have at least had a minimum of labor training and have certain occupational skills.

Many units hesitate to hire demobilized soldiers, because they are afraid that these people will be difficult to supervise.

A sociological study found that 62 percent of the demobilized soldiers had found jobs outside the state-operated sector. Only 22 percent had found jobs in state units, and only 2 percent had been recruited for international cooperative labor. There are some interesting figures that show the "priority" being given to finding jobs for demobilized soldiers: For every 100 demobilized soldiers who are given a recommendation for a job, only 22.25 percent are hired by industrial units. The rate for other groups is 39.84 percent. The rate in building and cargo handling units is much higher: 39.54 percent as compared with 24.44 percent and 27.75 percent as compared with 19.84 percent respectively. Demobilized soldiers are also last to be hired.

The Ho Chi Minh City Communist Youth Union has done many studies and found that 35 percent of the demobilized soldiers have stable jobs. The remaining 65 percent either do not have jobs or do not have stable work. The demobilized soldiers face many difficulties in finding jobs, and the organizations responsible have difficulties finding jobs for them. Few find jobs, and those who do usually find work as general laborers such as guards, porters, and stevedores. They earn an average income. But they want more sophisticated work and a higher income. The data have shown that 82.6 percent of

the demobilized soldiers hope to receive vocational training. But it is difficult for them to enter a vocational school, because 60 percent come from poor families and 33.3 percent are completely on their own. Only 42.9 percent can rely on their families.

Demobilized soldiers are in urgent need of jobs, but the time is past when the Labor, War Invalids, and Social Welfare Service can impose labor recruitment norms on units. Each production installation has the right to set its own requirements concerning the number and quality of laborers needed, particularly quality, that is, level of education and professional and vocational standards, and moral quality. Those at the conference made a number of suggestions:

The localities and echelons must give priority to training demobilized soldiers. They should try to use a variety of forms, but occupational assistance forms at the enterprises must be used to the maximum.

The demobilized soldiers must be given as much help as possible in finding jobs. Priority must be given to recruiting these people for international cooperative labor. An effort must be made to meet the recruitment needs of units both in and outside the state-operated sector.

The Ho Chi Minh City Communist Youth Union has also given priority to educating and teaching vocational skills to the demobilized soldiers. The Youth Union Standing Committee has advocated establishing a vocational studies aid fund for demobilized soldiers. Unfortunately, the party committee echelons, authorities, and sectors in the city and in the wards and districts have not provided much help and so this aid fund is still very small. However, with the exception of Precinct 8 and Tan Binh Ward, all the wards and districts in the city have provided support. Youth union members have made contributions, including discarded materials, and carried on youth projects to build the fund. The economic units and social organizations have built the fund by selling movie tickets and tickets to artistic performances. During the past year, the size of the fund has grown to more than 6 million dong. The youth union has used this money to aid 194 demobilized soldiers. On the average, each one has been given 5,000 dong a month to attend vocational school. Some places have issued education coupons free of charge while other places have issued cash. Some places have paid 30 percent of the education fees for the demobilized soldiers.

We feel that the Ho Chi Minh City Communist Youth Union deserves much praise for the innovations that it has made. These innovations can be used in many other localities. Some of these activities can strengthen society's concept of responsibility regarding providing jobs for demobilized soldiers.

As for educating the soldiers, many people suggested that this be done while they are still on active duty. The

military units should organize classes for the men. Providing them with a basic cultural standard will make it possible to increase the number of demobilized soldiers studying abroad and participating in international cooperative labor. At present, we lack a policy of giving priority to demobilized soldiers.

Returning to the problem of establishing vocational training aid funds for demobilized soldiers, we feel that every locality can establish such a fund. The Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union Central Committee can establish a fund on a national scale and seek contributions from state and social organizations, mass organizations both here and abroad, and the youth union's service and economic bases. As conditions permit, additional training centers can be opened for youths and demobilized soldiers in a number of large cities. This will help solve the problem of educating and training the demobilized soldiers.

In our society, labor is a very valuable asset. After they fulfill their military obligation, the young warriors rightfully expect to get a job, make a contribution to society, and stabilize their life and that of their family. The localities, sectors, echelons, and all elements of society must carry out their responsibilities so that our soldiers don't enter the ranks of the unemployed when they leave military service, which will only lead to countless other complex social problems.

## ECONOMIC

### Chinese Goods Flood Markets

42090265 Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG  
25 Apr 89 pp 1, 2

[Article by Mai Van: "Additional Challenge Not Only to Production Circle"]

[Text] A friend of mine recently returned from a visit to his home in Hanoi, carrying in his knapsack large quantities of bicycle chains, sprockets, wheel hubs, etc., produced in the Chinese People's Republic. He said, "Chinese goods up there are very cheap and the train ticket down here costs little." Those engaged in such "commercial endeavors"—and naturally extremely "part-time"—are only a few of the tens of thousands of people from all economic components who flock to the north to deal in Chinese goods. This is easily noticed on the trips of Thong Nhat vessels, provincial buses, express trains, and even aircraft. Traders travel north with rice, Du Lich, Mai and Da Lat cigarettes, native pullover shirts, etc., and bring Chinese goods back to the southern provinces and primarily Ho Chi Minh City—a large commercial center.

These temporary merchants are still a powerful force and constantly sensitive to the market. They maintain long distance telephone contact with individuals in Hanoi to

exchanges prices in both the south and the north. Personnel in the Saigon Industrial Trade Tax Station state, "A few months ago, traders entering the city were carrying bicycle parts, sewing machine motors, pliers, hammers, wrenches, etc. Recently, they have shifted to ginseng bowls, tubular ginseng, earthenware, porcelain, Van Luc beer, soap, etc." It must be stated clearly that the soap crossing the Sino-Vietnamese border is not produced in China but bears the ZEST and CAMAY labels of capitalist countries. Those traveling by train for the trading are presently only those with little capital, a few million dong or less. The big merchants hire entire trucks and even those with red license plates to easily pass market management and tax personnel.

State commercial units also have promptly participated in the Chinese goods trade. One unit in a western province sent an entire convoy of 10 heavy trucks all the way to Lang Son to buy Chinese goods. Someone was sent in advance to pay "station money" and ascertain the prices. On the morning of 19 April, right in front of the Dan Sinh market area, a 9-ton truck with the license plate of 50C "bestowed" 70,000 bottles of Van Luc beer on a state commercial unit.

In such a manner, Chinese goods are brought into the city by all means, are delivered to the west, or are scattered throughout the retail markets for the consumer.

In a circle through the city's markets, Chinese goods may be seen on sale everywhere, from small kiosks in the narrow side streets to grand state stores in the First Precinct, Fifth Precinct, etc. Bicycle parts produced in Shanghai often reach Tan Thanh Market; Van Luc beer, ginseng bowls, tubular ginseng, ginseng wine, etc. are sold in La Cai Market; enamel bowls and pots, etc. are sold at Ben Thanh Market; many wrenches, hammers, screwdrivers, locks, saw blades, rice cookers, etc. are seen at Dan Sinh market, Song Hy cigarettes are at the old Ton That Dam market, etc. It is impossible to relate all the Chinese goods on display in the city, from tiny items such as razor blades, electric test probes, glass pins, etc. to more bulky items: automatic oil stoves, wall clocks, Phuong Hoang bicycles, electric fans, etc.

Chinese goods pour into the city in increasingly greater numbers and because supply is presently greater than demand, they are dropping in price. A set of porcelain bowls that was previously nearly 20,000 dong is now sold at only 12,000 dong. A set of five enamel pots a few months ago was priced at 300,000 dong but now is only half that. ZEST soap is about 1,000 dong a cake cheaper than before. Bicycle parts, home machine tools, etc. are all being sold at prices 20 to 40 percent lower than a few months ago. Van Luc label Chinese beer is still being brought into the city in large quantities by traders because of the large profits. The price per bottle is 1,700 dong in Lang Son, 2,200 dong in Hanoi and 3,100 dong in Ho Chi Minh City.

A large number of low-priced and reliable quality Chinese goods are dominating domestically produced goods and are even competing with other imported foreign goods. A clerk in a store on Le Thi Rieng Street stated, "Chinese bicycle sprockets are twice as expensive as the Vietnamese type but eight out of ten buyers choose the Chinese brand." Thermos bottles "Made in China" are sold at 15,500 dong, resulting in no one wishing to buy the Binh Tay brand. The manager of Store 4 in Dan Sinh market said, "No matter how many Chinese Three Butterfly sewing machine motors there are, they are sold out." Middle class drinkers prefer Chinese beer because the price is no higher than our "50 beer" but there is more foam and the "effect" is much greater.

The Chinese goods and other imported goods flooding the city are a bad situation for producers. The operators of a few sporadic production facilities have closed their doors and gone to Vung Tau and Da Lat to escape the Saigon heat, and also to "avoid" the Chinese goods! Many are confused and have not yet found a way out despite capital, skills and zeal. The director of a machine cooperative in Lon Market (I will not mention the name) confided to this writer, "If Chinese bicycle sprockets and chains continue to be sold at the present price, I will surrender and close up shop."

Opening the doors of trade with other countries is a legitimate request and wish of every citizen, consistent with the present era of "peaceful coexistence." In conjunction with opening these doors, the large volume of foreign goods supplements shortages of domestic consumer goods. However, opening these doors in such a way that domestic production is not strangled to death is something that is not only a challenge to producers but also a demand for responsible leaders to issue uniform economic policies not only consistent with the legitimate wishes of the consumer but also stimulating domestic production development.

#### Swedish, Danish Assistance to Cement Plant

*BK0606090889 Hanoi VNA in English*  
0703 GMT 6 Jun 89

[Text] Hanoi VNA Jun 6—Since its inauguration in 1983 the Hoang Thach Cement Plant built in Hai Hung Province, some 50 km east of Hanoi, with money borrowed from the Danish Government has turned out three million tons of cement.

One of its key projects—the limestone quarrying and transport system—was built with the financial aid from the Swedish government through the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA).

In ten years from 1976 to 1986, the plant received from the Swedish government 49.5 million kronor worth of equipment. As a result, it has since early 1980, quarried more than three million cubic metres of limestone and 873,000 cubic metres of clay.

**Air Link Opens Between Jakarta-Ho Chi Minh City**  
**BK0406082289 Hanoi VNA in English**  
**0717 GMT 4 Jun 89**

[Text] Hanoi VNA June 4—An airliner of Indonesia's Garuda Airway landed on Tan Son Nhat Airport yesterday afternoon, opening the Jakarta-Ho Chi Minh City air line.

An inauguaral ceremony was held immediately after the landing of the first airplane, which carried 85 guests and passengers. Present on the occasion were representatives of the airline, trade, and tourism offices of the two countries.

The four-hour route will facilitate the socioeconomic exchanges between the two countries as well as their cooperation with other countries in the region.

There are two return flights a week, on Monday and Saturday.

**Jute Mill Completed; Salt Exports Up**  
**BK2405090389 Hanoi VNA in English**  
**0710 GMT 24 May 89**

[Text] Hanoi VNA May 24—A jute-spinning mill with a capacity of 3,000 tons a year has just been completed in the Red River Delta Province of Thai Binh, 100 km southeast of Hanoi. The province invested 1 billion Vietnamese dong in the mill's construction and more than \$5 million in its equipment. The mill is expected to be operational early next month.

—Since early this year, the southern coastal province of Thuan Hai has exported 9,000 tons of salt, up by 2.5 times over the same period last year.

—The Song Trem Forestry Station in the southernmost province of Minh Hai has fulfilled its plan of afforesting 10,200 hectares two years ahead of schedule.

**Low Vegetable Prices in Hanoi, Problems for Producers**

*42090202 Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 9 Mar 89 p 1*

[Article by Tran Anh Thai: "Vegetable Prices in Hanoi Are too Low; the Harvest Was Good But Producers Are Still Experiencing Problems; 10 Kg of Cabbage Fetches Only 1 Kg of Rice"]

[Text] It can be said that the 1988-1989 vegetable harvest was one of the best harvests ever in Hanoi. The 10,980 hectares planted in vegetables produced an average yield of 152 tons per hectare. It is estimated that the yield for the entire crop will be more than 170,080 tons, an increase of 10,000 tons as compared with the 1987-1988 vegetable season. The yields of a number of types of off-season vegetables such as cabbage and Thai Binh beets increased dramatically. In almost all the rural areas

of Hanoi where vegetables are grown, even though the area was not enlarged, yields increased 20-50 percent as compared with last year.

The main thing responsible for the excellent vegetable and fruit harvest in Hanoi has been the policy of eliminating state subsidies in agriculture. The state has made a great effort to encourage every economic element to participate in production. Also, there has been an extended cold period, which has been favorable for growing vegetables, and the producers have invested large sums of capital in order to carry on intensive cultivation. It would seem that with an excellent harvest, the producers would be very happy because of earning a high income. But in reality, the vegetable producers are experiencing many problems this year, because vegetable prices are very low. Their incomes are very low and are out of proportion to the amount of labor expended and the amount of capital invested. Checks at the Hanoi market at the end of January and the beginning of February 1989 showed that kohlrabi was selling for only 50-60 dong per kg. One kg of cabbage was selling for only 80-100 dong. Tomatoes were selling for 150-200 dong per kg, and potatoes were 200 dong per kg. The selling prices of vegetables and fruits have increased very little. Many types of vegetables are selling for a very low price. According to calculations made by vegetable growers, 10 kg of cabbage will fetch only 1 kg of rice. As compared with manufactured goods, a kg of kohlrabi is the equivalent of only one Du Lich cigarette. Because vegetable and fruit prices are so low, the producers are in a dilemma. If they bring their produce to market, they lose money, but if they don't, the vegetables rot. Thus, they have to take them to market and sell them for as high a price as possible. All they can do is accept their losses. A farmer who lives in the Dong Anh vegetable zone said that if he brings 40 kg of cabbage from Dong Anh to Hanoi, the transportation charges there and back amount to 1,500 dong, and lunch and dinner cost 800 dong. But he can sell the 40 kg of cabbage for only 4,000 dong. When you consider the amount of capital invested and the number of man-days spent tending the vegetables, there is almost a 50 percent loss. Because vegetable prices are so low, the producers are in a desperate frame of mind. Their income from growing vegetables is really very low, and so they are facing serious hardships.

The low vegetable prices have disquieted the producers. One of the main reasons for this is the large gap between supply and demand. In Hanoi, if each person needs an average of 5 kg of vegetables per month, that means that about 150 tons of vegetables are needed each day. But about 300 tons of vegetables a day are brought into the city by state and private enterprises. Thus, supply far exceeds demand. On the other hand, during the harvest season, the vegetable producers usually can't find a market and the state purchases only 20 percent of their yields. Thus, the peasants have to "dump" their remaining vegetables on the market. But the experiences of past years have shown that low prices as compared with the labor and capital invested by the producers is a phenomenon that occurs

only during the main season. During the preharvest season, there are shortages of vegetables and prices usually double or triple. At the same time, state-operated commerce does not have large processing bases to store vegetables and fruit for the preharvest lean period. On the other hand, during the main season in Hanoi when vegetables and fruit are in great abundance and very cheap, there are shortages of vegetables in Ho Chi Minh City and the northern border area. For example, at a time when the price of potatoes in Hanoi is 200 dong per kg, they sell for 700 dong in Ho Chi Minh City and 350 dong along the northern border. There are similar price differences for a number of other vegetables, such as cabbage and tomatoes. But the producers must put up with the low prices in Hanoi, because there is no way for them to transport and sell their vegetables elsewhere.

In view of the above situation, to bring peace of mind to the vegetable producers and ensure that they earn sufficient money to stabilize their lives, the state must implement a rational policy in order to stimulate production. The commercial sector must be the main customer of the peasants and become the principal market for the goods produced by the farmers. The signing of production and product sales contracts must be organized in a responsible manner, and the contracts that have been signed must not be violated. During the main seasons, the commercial sector must actively seek markets in the other provinces and help move the surplus vegetables in Hanoi to other provinces that need vegetables. The situation in which the vegetable growers in Hanoi can't find markets and prices are low while other provinces lack vegetables and prices are high cannot be allowed to continue. On the other hand, the city must provide the commercial sector with a number of vegetable and fruit processing installations, storehouses, and cold-storage installations in order to increase reserves. At present, the Hanoi Fruit and Vegetable Corporation is the unit primarily responsible for supplying vegetables and fruit to the city. But it has only one small processing installation with a capacity of approximately 200 tons a year while consumer demand is 5,000 tons a month during the preharvest lean period. Thus, without good processing installations, it will be impossible to put an end to the situation in which there is a surplus of vegetables during the main season and a shortage during the preharvest period.

Besides this, the commercial sector must establish a relationship with the import and export units in order to export vegetables and fruit, bring in foreign currency, and keep the producers from suffering heavy losses because of product consumption problems as at present.

#### **Discussion on Weaknesses, Tasks of Peasants Association**

42090201 Vietnamese QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by Tuan Ngoc: "How Has the Vietnam Peasants Association Developed in the Year Since the National Congress?"]

[Text] It has been 1 year since the Vietnam Peasants Association held its national congress. Since the congress,

the various association echelons have been solidified, and they have achieved a number of results in gaining ideological understanding, strengthening the cadres, and bringing in new members. The association has formed executive committees from the village and subward levels to the provincial and municipal levels. In the provinces, cities, and special zones, the association has received guidance from the party committee echelons, coordinated things with the sectors concerned in implementing political activity campaigns in the regions, and helped people to gain a thorough understanding of the 10th resolution of the Politburo on making innovations in economic and agricultural management and Directive 47 of the Politburo on solving a number of urgent problems concerning land. Through training seminars, the association members and peasants have increased their understanding of the party committee echelons, authorities, and sectors, and they have gained a clearer understanding of the role of the association in economic and social life.

In many places, the association echelons educated, mobilized, and organized their members and promoted revolutionary action movements. They concentrated on the three main economic programs and aimed at the other social targets of the localities. These included the peasant solidarity and mutual aid movement to overcome the difficulties in life and production; the movement to expand the family economy, accept contracts based on quotas and unit prices, pay the taxes, and fulfill the contracts with the state and other units; and the movement to build water conservancy projects in the fields, control drought, produce fertilizer, make use of the technical advances in production, control harmful insects and diseases, and so on to contribute to promoting intensive cultivation and multi-cropping and increasing crop yields and livestock productivity. Many places have exploited the labor potential and manifested the strengths of each locality concerning arable land, capital, and occupations in order to produce many agricultural products that provide jobs, and increase the incomes of the peasant families. This has been done, for example, by planting a winter crop in the Red River Delta, expanding the rice growing area in Dong Thap Muoi, the Long Xuyen quadrangle, and the U Minh area; planting industrial crops, export medicinal plants, pepper, coffee, cinnamon, and anise; raising aquatic products in eastern Nam Bo, the Central Highlands, the midlands, the northern mountain areas, and along the central coast; planting dispersed crops, carrying on a settled farming and settled life movement, transferring land and forest areas, and raising gardens in the hills and forests in the Central Highlands, midlands, and northern mountains areas.

The Vietnam Peasants Association has participated in consolidating the collective economic organizations using suitable forms and contributed manpower and money to repairing and building roads and bridges, child-care centers, schools, and medical aid stations. Many association echelons in the north and along the

central coast have participated in eliminating hunger during the preharvest lean period and fifth-month and spring season and in overcoming the effects of Typhoon No 10. In many places, particularly Nam Bo, the association echelons, particularly the bases, have implemented the Land Law and the party's land policies. They have participated in resolving many disputes over land and contributed to stabilizing production and maintaining solidarity in the rural areas. In many places such as Ha Nam Ninh, Haiphong, Thai Binh, Ha Bac, Ho Chi Minh City, Ben Tre, Quang Ninh, Nghia Binh, Phu Khanh, Binh Tri Thien, Thuan Hai, Vung Tau-Con Dao, and Son La, the association has participated in making inspections, discovered and handled many negative aspects in the cooperatives and production collectives, and at the same time given suggestions to the party committee echelons about the deployment of the cadres. They have also contributed to building the party and administration in accord with the spirit of the resolution of the Fifth Plenum of the Party Central Committee.

The activities of the association are still weak in many respects. This is because the organization of the association at the four levels is not strong enough. Many places are still confused about making innovations in the contents and operating formulas in accord with the spirit of Directive 5 of the Secretariat, the resolution of the association's First National Congress, and the association's statutes. In the mountain areas, remote tribal areas, and fishing zones, there are no associations or the associations have not been solidified. The ranks of primary-level cadres are not stable, and they have not been trained in accord with the needs, tasks, and association statutes. Association members and branch associations do not carry on activities regularly, and the contents of the activities do not concern the everyday problems of rural life. One of the reasons for this state of affairs is that the association is slow to respond. It misses opportunities and does things based on old ways. Also, the association has not obtained guidance from the party committee echelons or obtained help from the authorities and sectors. It still employs its cadres in an arbitrary manner, and people are not treated fairly.

During its recent meeting in Hanoi, the Central Committee of the Vietnam Peasants Association decided that in 1989, the association must change its organization, contents, and operating formulas in order to satisfy the requirements of the new era.

The association will concentrate on carrying out a number of important tasks, including:

Based on the economic and social targets of the localities, the association echelons must mobilize members of the peasants association to expand production in the collective, family, and individual sectors, carry on intensive cultivation, exceed the multicropping contracts, open additional areas, produce a large volume of key products of high value for export such as tea, coffee, redwood, pepper, vegetables, and fruit, perfect and

expand the product contract mechanism based on the quotas and unit prices for all types of crops and animals and in all sectors, and fulfill their obligations to the state and collectives.

The association must study and adhere to the spirit of Politburo Directive 47, Notice No 123 of the Secretariat on guidance, and the Land Law. It must concentrate on thoroughly understanding the positions and policies of the party and state, and under the guidance of the party committee echelons, actively coordinate things with the sectors in examining things and resolving specific land disputes on the spot using a variety of forms and methods. Educational methods, campaigns, persuasion, democracy, and openness must be used to get the peasants to select plans that will benefit both themselves and others. The shortcomings and irrational aspects must be overcome quickly. At the same time, this must be related to the task of implementing the resolution on making innovations in agricultural economic management, ensuring that the peasants have enough work, exploiting the production capabilities, and improving the peasants' standard of living.

The association must expand its inspection role in classifying land, give area and productivity contracts, and set livestock and agricultural implement prices. The distribution and use of the funds of the cooperatives and production collectives must be inspected. Fairness, democracy, and openness must be ensured in signing and implementing contracts between the state economic organizations and the economic elements concerning production services, marketing, and prices.

The situation regarding the lives and production of the peasants must be investigated, and the reasons must be analyzed in order to have active measures to solve the problems and gradually put an end to hunger among the poor peasants during the preharvest lean period. Suggestions must be given to the authorities on establishing social welfare funds in the rural areas with the contributions of all classes of people. There must be specific plans to help the poor peasant households that lack capital and production experience and that are experiencing difficulties so that they can gradually improve their standard of living. Attention must be given above all to the families in the policy category.

Preliminary lessons must be drawn from implementing Resolution 4 of the Politburo. Measures must be implemented to continue carrying on the major movements, and there must be active participation in eliminating the negative aspects. The peasants must be encouraged to denounce the abuse of power, the illegal use of land, corruption, theft of public property, bribery, factionalism, and the oppression and beating of honest citizens. People must be vigilant in order to prevent bad elements and opportunists from slandering and attacking the good cadres.

A new socialist rural area development movement must be organized, and political security and social order must

be maintained. Public welfare projects must be built, the new way of life must be carried on, and corrupt customs and social vices must be eliminated. Cultural activities and newspaper readings must be organized. Propaganda and educational activities must be carried on to enable rural youths to clearly understand the value of family planning and the close relationship between this and expanding the national economy and reducing the population growth rate. These activities must be carried on so that each person is aware of this and practices family planning.

The quality of the association members must be improved. The association organizations and bases must be developed and solidified. Steps must be taken to ensure that the activities of the association are imbued with a spirit of democracy and that they are open and practical. Things must be classified in order to have plans to solidify and expand the association organizations in the remote mountain areas. Membership in the association must be increased. The activities of the association in the fishing, salt, and other rural area occupations must be guided. The contents of the activities and the methods of the primary-level association organizations must be changed. The activities of the association branches, teams, and members must be put on the right track, there must be practical themes, the cadres must be trained, emphasis must be placed on developing the financial position of the association in accord with the laws of the state, and the payment of association fees must be promoted.

International relations must be promoted, and people must be imbued with a spirit of socialist international solidarity with peasant organizations throughout the world, particularly the fraternal socialist countries, based on the guideline of gaining more friends, reducing the number of enemies, and maintaining peace in order to build the country.

## SOCIAL

### NHAN DAN Article Reviews Red Cross Activities BK3105035289 Hanoi VNA in English 1525 GMT 30 May 89

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Hanoi VNA May 30—"Born with the founding of the socialist state, the Red Cross movement in Vietnam has taken many important steps of development to become a real humanitarian organization and, laying its hope and confidence in the future, it is determined to further intensify its activities for the sake of humanitarian ideals and traditions," wrote Prof. Nguyen Trong Nhan, Vietnamese Red Cross president, in an article in the national paper NHAN DAN today.

The article, reviewing the Vietnam Red Cross's activities over the past 2 years in celebration of the 125th anniversary of the International Red Cross Movement, of

which Vietnam is a member, says: "Red Cross chapters have been set up in 66.3 percent of the urban precincts and rural districts, at 38.5 percent of the villages and equivalent units, and at 2,824 basic general education schools throughout the country with hundreds of thousands of voluntary members.

Together with the public health service, in the past 2 years, the Red Cross opened two training courses on immunization and conducted a mass immunization campaign involving 1,400,000 Red Cross workers and benefiting nearly 7,000,000 children. More than one million Red Cross activists took part in an environmental protection campaign aimed at improving environmental sanitation. In a number of localities, Red Cross members and medical workers jointly took part in conducting dental and ophthalmic checks at basic general schools and helping old-aged people have cataract treatment. Red Cross workers gave first aids to 442,000 emergency cases, saving many of them from being drowned, attended to nearly two million sick persons at their houses, and planted many gardens of medicinal herbs which totally yielded more than 170,000 tons of medicinal materials.

The Red Cross mobilized the donations of nearly 500 million dong, 64,666 tons of rice, more than 445,000 meters of cloth, nearly two million medicine tablets and ampoules, and large quantities of consumer goods and stationery and distributed them to needy people in areas affected by poor harvests or natural calamities."

On international cooperation, Prof. Nguyen Trong Nhan recalled the generous material assistance of the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent, and the Red Cross organizations of the Soviet Union, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, the Netherlands, France, Sweden, Japan, and Switzerland; and the Vietnam Red Cross's efforts in distributing and managing these donations. He also referred to the Red Cross-sponsored mass movement in Vietnam recently to raise money to help the earthquake victims in the Armenian Soviet Republic and the rescue operation to save America air crash victims in the Truong Sa [Spratly] Archipelago region last year.

Eighteen foreign Red Cross delegations, including presidents of the French and Swiss Red Cross, visited Vietnam to promote bilateral cooperation. On its part, the Vietnamese Red Cross sent eight delegations abroad to exchange experiences with foreign friends. Many foreign Red Cross organizations expressed their readiness to contribute to the development of the Vietnamese Red Cross, he said.

### Red Cross Donates Money for Natural Calamity Victims BK2805073489 Hanoi VNA in English 0711 GMT 28 May 89

[Text] Hanoi VNA May 28—The League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies has, in response to the

Vietnam Red Cross' appeal, sent \$220,000 as relief to areas in 12 provinces of Vietnam affected by natural calamities in the recent past.

The sum has been used for the purchase in Vietnam of 300 [metric] tons of rice, 17,000 mosquito nets and 200,000 metres of textile. Red Cross organizations throughout the country have collaborated with the Social Welfare and War Invalids Services in packing, transporting and delivering the relief goods to the recipients.

#### Tropical Storm Damage 'Heavy' in Central Province

BK2905092389 Hanoi VNA in English  
0721 GMT 29 May 89

[Text] Hanoi VNA May 29—The storm Cecil which hit central Vietnam on May 25 and 26 caused heavy losses in human lives and property to the coastal province of Quang Nam-Danang.

According to latest reports, 78 persons were killed, 50 injured and 364 others reported missing. Rainfall measured 300 mm on average, in some places as high as 500 mm. The storm submerged 20,000 hectares of spring-winter rice nearing harvest, overbrimmed more than 500 hectares of shrimp and fish ponds, damaged 3,000 [metric] tons of paddy, 1,000 tons of cement and 50 tons of chemicals and fertilizers. It sank or seriously damaged nearly 3,000 vessels of various types. In addition, it destroyed 150 schools and 9,000 dwelling houses, and blew off the roofs of 14,500 other houses, rendering 150,000 people homeless, paralyzed the provincial communication system and part of the electric power grid, ravaged many orchards, plantations and forests. Total property loss is estimated at more than Vietnamese dong 93 billion.

President of the State Council Vo Chi Cong has sent a message expressing his deep sympathy with the population of Quang Nam-Danang.

#### BIOGRAPHIC

##### Information on Vietnamese Personalities 42090213

[Editorial Report] The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisk indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.

##### Vu Ngoc Bo [VUX NGOCJ BOOJ]

Chairman of the People's Committee, Cao Bang Province. He was interviewed about self-defense forces. [QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 5 Dec 88 p 2]

##### Nguyen Hong Cu [NGUYEENX HOONGF CUW] \*Lieutenant General

Deputy Director of the Political General Department. Recently, he met with the staff of the military newspaper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 17 Feb 89 p 1)

##### Nguyen Minh Chau [NGUYEENX MINH CHAAU], Colonel, deceased

Member of the CPV, Member of the Executive Committee of the Vietnam Writers Association, contributing writer to the journal VAN NGHE QUAN DOI. Born on 20 October 1930, in Quynh Luu District, Nghe Tinh Province, he died at the 108th Military Hospital on 23 January 1989. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 26 Jan 89 p 4)

##### Thai Dung [THAIS ZUNGX] \*Major General

His name was mentioned in an article on a reunion of veterans of the war against the French. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 27 Dec 88 p 4)

##### Nguyen De [NGUYEENX DEEJ] Lieutenant General

\*Commander of the 9th MR. He was interviewed about conscription results. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 14 Feb 89 p 2)

##### Nguyen Hai [NGUYEENX HAIR] \*Major General

\*Commander of the 15th Corps. He answered a reader's query about a land dispute. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 2 Jan 89 p 3)

##### Nguyen Huu Hiep [NGUYEENX HUWUX HIEEPJ]

\*Director of the Education Service, Hau Giang Province. He wrote an article on educating the Khmer. (NGHIEN CUU GIAO DUC May 88 p 17)

##### Doan Khue [DOANF KHUEE] Colonel General

Member of the CPV Central Committee, chief of staff of the VPA, vice minister of national defense. He attended a conference organized by the Rear Services General Department. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 Jan 89 p 1)

##### Nong Duc Manh [NOONG DUWCS MANHJ]

\*Secretary of the CPV Committee, Bac Thai Province. He was interviewed about self-defense forces. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 13 Jan 89 p 2)

##### Tran Cong Man [TRAANF COONG MAAN] Major General

Editor-in-chief of the military newspaper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN. He attended a meeting with high-ranking VPA officials. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 17 Feb 89 p 1)

**Nguyen Duc Minh [NGUYEENS DUWCS MINH]  
Professor**

Deputy director of the Vietnam Education Science Institute, Ministry of Education. His picture and a brief biographical note appeared in the cited source. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 13 Jan 89 p 3)

**Nguyen Trong Nhan [NGUYEENX TRONGJ  
NHAAN]**

\*Member of the Presidium of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, director of the Vietnamese Red Cross. He visited the troops in Lang Son Province. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 2 Feb 89 p 1)

**Bui Phung [BUIF PHUNGF] Colonel General**

Vice minister of national defense. He attended a meeting organized by the Rear Services General Department. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 Jan 89 p 1)

**Hoang Phuong [HOANGF PHUWOWNG] Lieutenant General**

He wrote an article on the 200th anniversary of the Dong Da Battle. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 10 Feb 89 p 2)

**Nguyen Quyet [NGUYEENX QUYEETS] Colonel General**

Secretary of the CPV Central Committee, vice chairman of the Council of State, director of the Political General Department. Recently he attended a meeting to award orders to several Navy vessels. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 Jan 89 p 1)

**Tran Sam [TRAANF SAAM] Colonel General**

Vice minister of national defense. On 31 Jan, he attended a conference organized by the Technical General Department. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 2 Feb 89 p 1)

**Trinh To Tam [TRINHJ TOOS TAAM]**

\*Secretary of the Central Committee of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union. He led a delegation on a visit to Group S.14, Huong Giang Corps. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 22 Dec 88 p 1)

**Le Thi [LEE THI]**

\*Director of the Sports and Physical Education Service, Nghia Binh Province. He was mentioned in an article on a boxing meet in Quang Nam-Da Nang. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 21 Dec 88 p 4)

**Pham Tho [PHAMJ THOJ] \*Colonel**

Director of the Training Office, Special Operations Branch. He wrote an article on training. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 9 Feb 89 p 2)

**Truong Van Thoan [TRUWOWNG VAWN THOAN]**

Deputy director of the Post and Telecommunications General Department. He wrote an article on postal cooperation between Vietnam and Laos. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 17 Jul 88 p 3)

**Nguyen Trong Xuyen [NGUYEENX TRONGJ  
XUYEEN] \*Lieutenant General**

Vice minister of national defense, director of the Rear Services General Department. He was present at a meeting with other high-ranking VPA officials. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 17 Feb 89 p 1)

**Le Danh Xuong [LEE ZANH XUWOWNG]**

Secretary of the CPV Committee, Haiphong Municipality. On 28 Jan, he attended a meeting on the 30th anniversary of the Vietnam-Czechoslovakia Friendship Hospital. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 31 Jan 89 p 4)

**Ha Van Ban [HAF VAWN BAN]**

Chairman of the People's Committee, Thanh Hoa Province; his name and position were mentioned in an article on Thanh Hoa Province. (NONG NGHIEP VIETNAM 9 Mar 89 p 3)

**Le Khac Binh [LEE KHAWCS BINHF]**

Vice chairman of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; on 25 March 1989 he attended a conference on credit cooperatives in Ho Chi Minh City. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 26 Mar 89 p 1)

**Nguyen Canh Cau [NGUYEENX CANHR CAAUF],  
Colonel**

\*Head of the Dermatology and Venereal Disease Department of the Military Medical Institute; he wrote an article on acupuncture in the cited source. (KHOA HOC VA DOI SONG 1 Mar 89 p 5)

**Le Viet Cong [LEE VIEETS COONGS]**

\*Vice chairman of the People's Committee, Binh Tri Thien Province; recently he attended a meeting in Hue city for the co-op federations. (SANG TAO 17 Feb 89 p 3)

**Van Tien Dung [VAWN TIEENS ZUNGX]**

Member of the CPV Central Committee; on 31 January 1989 he attended a conference in Hanoi to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the Ngoc Hoi-Dong Da victory. (HANOI MOI 1 Feb 89 p 1)

**Pham The Duyet [PHAMJ THEES ZUYEETJ]**

Secretary of the CPV Committee, Hanoi Municipality; on 12 April 1989 he attended the 18th meeting of the 9th Hanoi Municipal People's Committee. (HANOI MOI 13 Apr 89 p 1)

**Lu Giang [LUW GIANG], Lt. General**

Commander of the Capital Military Region; on 31 January 1989 he chaired a conference in Hanoi to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the Ngoc Hoi-Dong Da victory. (HANOI MOI 1 Feb 89 p 1)

**Vo Dong Giang [VOX DOONG GIANG]**

Former minister and chairman of the Commission for External Economic Relations; minister and \*vice chairman of the State Commission for Cooperation and Investment. He was appointed to the latter position at a recent meeting of the State Council. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Mar 89 pp 1, 2)

**Vo Nguyen Giap [VOX NGUYEEN GIAPS]**

Member of the CPV Central Committee; vice chairman of the Council of Ministers; on 31 January 1989 he attended a conference in Hanoi to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the Ngoc Hoi-Dong Da victory. (HANOI MOI 1 Feb 89 p 1)

**Pham Minh Hac [PHAMJ MINH HACJ]**

Minister of education; his article on education was published in the cited source. (GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 20 Mar 89 p 1)

**Pham Van Hung [PHAMJ VAWN HUNGF]**

\*Deputy director of the Organization Department of the CPV Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; his article on preparing for the party Congress was published in the cited source. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 15 Mar 89 p 2)

**Nguyen Van Hung [NGUYEENX VAWN HUNGF]**

Secretary of the municipal Security Forces Youth Union of Ho Chi Minh City; his name and position were mentioned in an article on an anti-drug program. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 22 Mar 89 p 2)

**Nguyen Dinh Huong [NGUYEENX DINHF HUWOWNG]**

Member of the CPV Central Committee; deputy director of the Organization Department of the CPV Central Committee; on 13 Mar 1989 he was present at a meeting between General Secretary Nguyen Van Linh and a visiting Lao delegation. (NHAN DAN 14 Mar 89 p 1)

**Nguyen Van Huong [NGUYEENX VAWN HUWOWNGF]**

Deputy director of the Office of the Council of Ministers; on 14 March 1989 he attended the 8th Congress of the Committee for Cooperation in Higher Education between Vietnam and Holland. (NHAN DAN 14 Mar 89 p 1)

**Phan Van Khai [PHAN VAWN KHAIR]**

Chairman of the People's Committee of Ho Chi Minh City; \*chairman of the State Planning Commission; he was appointed to the latter position following the decision of the State Council at its meeting on 2-3 March 1989. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Mar 89 pp 1, 2)

**Nguyen Phan Long [NGUYEENX PHAN LONG]**

\*Deputy director of the Seaway General Department and director of Hai Phong Seaport; his name and position were mentioned in an article on Hai Phong Seaport published in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 21 Mar 89 p 4)

**Tam Long [TAAM LONG]**

Vice minister of interior; on 11 February 1989 he attended a press conference held by the Office of the National Assembly. (GIAO VIEN NHAN DAN 27 Feb 89 p 3)

**Bui Duc Loc [BUIF DUWCS LOOCJ]**

\*Deputy director of the Overseas Vietnamese Department of the CPV Central Committee; on 31 January 1989 he attended a reception for overseas Vietnamese in Hanoi. (HANOI MOI 1 Feb 89 p 1)

**Nguyen Thien Luan [NGUYEENX THIEENJ LUAAN]**

Permanent vice minister of the Agriculture and Food Industry; on 30 January 1989 he welcomed the French minister of agriculture visiting Vietnam. (HANOI MOI 31 Jan 89 p 1)

**Nguyen Mai [NGUYEENX MAIJ]**

Vice chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi Municipality; on 12 April 1989 he attended the 18th meeting of the 9th Hanoi Municipal People's Committee. (HANOI MOI 13 Apr 89 p 1)

**Nguyen Vinh Nghiep [NGUYEENX VINHX NGHIEEPJ]**

\*Acting chairman of the People's Committee, Ho Chi Minh City; on 18 March 1989 he attended a symposium to discuss the city's care for children. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 19 Mar 89 p 1)

**Tran Tu Quan [TRAANF TUWS QUANS]**

\*Chairman of the Patriotic Vietnamese Association in Italy; recently he welcomed a Vietnamese delegation visiting Italy. (SANG TAO 24 Feb 89 p 3)

**To Van Son [TOO VAWN SOWN]**

\*Vice chairman of the Patriotic Vietnamese Association in Italy; director of VIETITAL company in Italy; recently he helped a Vietnamese delegation visiting Italy. (SANG TAO 24 Feb 89 p 3)

**Bui Xuan Tam [BUIF XUAAN TAMS], Colonel, Professor**

\*Director of the 103 Military Hospital; he wrote an article on traditional medicine in the cited source. (KHOA HOC VA DOI SONG 1 Mar 89 p 5)

**Tran Tan [TRAANF TAANS]**

Chairman of the People's Committee, Hanoi Municipality; on 12 April 1989 he attended the 18th meeting of the 9th Hanoi Municipal People's Committee. (HANOI MOI 13 Apr 89 p 1)

**Trinh Ngoc Thai [TRINHJ NGOCJ THAIS]**

Deputy director of the Foreign Relations Department of the CPV Central Committee; on 2 February 1989 he attended a reception held by the Mongolian Ambassador in Hanoi. (HANOI MOI 3 Feb 89 p 1)

**Phan Minh Thanh [PHAN MINH THANH]**

\*Chairman of the People's Committee, Tien Giang Province; his article on Tien Giang Province was published in the cited source. (NHAN DAN 22 Mar 89 p 3)

**Hoang Minh Thao [HOANGF MINH THAOR], Colonel General**

His report was introduced at the conference held in Hanoi on 31 January 1989 to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the Ngoc Hoi-Dong Da victory. (HANOI MOI 1 Feb 89 p 1)

**Tran Xuan Thuy [TRAANF XUAAN THUYR], aka Tran Son Thuy [TRAANF SOWN THUYR]**

Vice minister of forestry; on 9 March 1989 he signed a forestry development project with the WFP representative in Hanoi. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 12 Mar 89 p 1)

**Nguyen Tan Trinh [NGUYEENX TAANS TRINHJ]**

Minister of marine products; on 3-6 March 1989 he welcomed a Soviet delegation visiting Vietnam. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 7 Mar 89 p 1)

**Bui Manh Trung [BUIF MANHJ TRUNG]**

\*Chairman of the Proselytizing Committee and Member of the Hanoi CPV Committee; \*permanent vice chairman of the Hanoi Fatherland Front; on 31 January 1989 he attended a meeting for the Hoa people in Hanoi. (HANOI MOI 1 Feb 89 p 1)

**Tran Van Tuan [TRAANF VAWN TUAANS]**

Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union, Hanoi Municipality; on 31 January 1989 he attended a Dong Da Ward Youth Union meeting in Hanoi to review the Union's work in 1988 and make plans for 1989. (HANOI MOI 1 Feb 89 p 1)

**Tong Duy Vuong [TOONGS ZUY VUWOWNGJ]**

\*Chairman of the Fatherland Front, Thai Binh Province; he wrote an article in the cited source on the Fatherland Front. (DAI DOAN KET 24 Mar 89 p 2)

**Dau Ngoc Xuan [DAAUJ NGOCJ XUAAN]**

Minister, \*vice chairman of the State Commission for Cooperation and Investment; following the decision of the State Council, he was appointed to the above position and relieved of his position as chairman of the State Planning Commission. (Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG 5 Mar 89 pp 1, 2)

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